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THE SCOPE OF PRECEDENT
Randy J. Kozel *
The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the
prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed,
oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta.
This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational
debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward-looking effect should not depend on the superficial categories of holding
and dictum. Instead, it should reflect deeper normative commitments that define the nature of adjudication within American legal culture.
The account that emerges is one in which the scope of precedent is inextricably
linked to interpretive theory and constitutional understandings. Divergent
methods of interpretation, from originalism to common law constitutionalism
and beyond, carry distinctive implications for describing a precedent’s constraining effect. So, too, do various methods of interpretation in the statutory
and common law contexts. Ultimately, what should determine the scope of
precedent is the set of premises—regarding the judicial role, the separation of
powers, and the relevance of history, morality, and policy—that informs a
judge’s methodological choices.
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Introduction
Whether to overrule a dubious precedent is one of the most significant
and complex questions that judges confront.1 The topic has, quite properly,
1. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical
as It Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 261 (2005) (“How and when precedent should be
rejected remains one of the great unresolved controversies of jurisprudence.”).
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received considerable attention in case law,2 scholarly commentary,3 and political discourse.4
But there is a complementary question of equal significance—and equal
complexity—whose nuances have received less attention in recent scholarship.5 That question is whether a given precedent applies to a newly arising
dispute.6 If the answer is yes, the prospect of overruling becomes relevant. If
the answer is no, it is unnecessary to assess the costs and benefits of deviating from settled law. A precedent’s scope of applicability thus presents a
matter of threshold importance.7
Issues of precedential scope are ever present and often controversial.
Should a decision dealing with the use of affirmative action at the University
of Michigan apply to the University of Texas notwithstanding differences in
the schools’ demographic conditions?8 Should a decision protecting a corporation’s right to participate in political referenda apply to candidate elections?9 To the rights of labor unions?10 Should a decision striking down a
2. For recent examples at the U.S. Supreme Court, see Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876, 911–12 (2010); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009); and Montejo v. Louisiana, 556
U.S. 778, 797 (2009).
3. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803 (2009); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 929 (2008); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism,
Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1437 (2007); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144 (2005) (“An
overruling of a prior precedent is a jolt to the legal system. It is inconsistent with principles of
stability and yet . . . the principles of stare decisis recognize that there are situations when that’s
a price that has to be paid.”).
5. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 953,
958 n.11 (2005) (noting the relative paucity of scholarly attention to precedential scope in
recent years). Among the most notable exceptions are Professors Abramowicz and Stearns’s
article and Professor Duxbury’s insightful book on precedent and legal reasoning. See generally
Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (2008).
6. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L.
Rev. 1173, 1199 (2006) (“It is one thing to say that a precedent should be followed. It is
another to say precisely what it means to follow precedent.”).
7. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 5, at 957 (“[B]efore a court can decide
whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to a given case, it must first determine just what
that case purports to establish.”); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 372
(1988) (isolating the question of precedential scope for independent analysis).
8. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), with Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
9. Compare Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), with Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
10. See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, at 3 n.3 (Commonsense Ten) (2010) (noting that
“Citizens United did not directly address whether labor organizations” enjoy the same constitutional protections as corporations in advocating for the election or defeat of political
candidates).
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federal statute that rejects same-sex marriage apply to comparable statutes
enacted by the states?11
These questions aim to define the scope of precedent. The standard account of scope begins with the distinction between binding holdings and
nonessential dicta: judicial holdings are entitled to deference from future
courts, while everything else is dispensable.12 Indeed, the Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed that dicta from its prior opinions may be freely disregarded. Simply because the Court has “once written dicta calling a tomato a
vegetable” does not mean that subsequent judges are “bound to deny that it
is fruit forever after.”13
Nevertheless, the Court’s practice often departs from these general principles. The inconsistency runs deeper than the well-chronicled difficulty of
sorting dicta from holdings in particular cases.14 To be sure, the Court goes
to great lengths to characterize certain statements as mere dicta that can be
jettisoned without reservation. But in many other cases, the Court defers to
elements of its prior opinions that extend far beyond the narrow application
of a legal rule to a discrete set of facts.15 Those elements include doctrinal
frameworks, elaborate judicial instructions, and broadly articulated rationales.16 The phenomenon is even more pronounced in the lower federal
courts, many of which unabashedly defer to Supreme Court dicta. Recent
scholarship underscores the point by highlighting the porous nature of the
line between holdings and dicta in practice.17 The result is the prevalence of
11. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the
distinct question whether the States . . . may continue to utilize the traditional definition of
marriage.”).
12. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (describing dicta as “not
precedential”).
13. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013); see also, e.g., Jama v.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 351 n.12 (2005) (“Dictum settles nothing, even in the court that utters it.”).
14. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997, 2005 (1994)
(arguing that “[a]s currently understood, the distinction [between holding and dicta] is almost
entirely malleable”); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 54, 124 (1997) (“It is notorious, even to the Justices themselves, that a broad ambit
frequently exists for reasonable disagreement about how precedents are best interpreted and
tests best applied.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 743 (1988) (“Because a coherent rationale for the intermittent invocation
of stare decisis has not been forthcoming, the impression is created that the doctrine is invoked only as a mask hiding other considerations.”).
15. See infra Sections I.B–C.
16. See Fallon, supra note 14, at 56 (“Among the most important functions of the Supreme Court are to craft and apply constitutional doctrine—a term that [includes] not only
the holdings of cases, but also the analytical frameworks and tests that the Court’s cases establish.” (footnote omitted)).
17. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2021, 2026 (2013) (arguing that “[l]ower courts
often mention the distinction between holding and dictum but hardly ever invoke it in consequential ways”); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 Brook.

November 2014]

The Scope of Precedent

183

an inclusive paradigm of precedent in which binding effect attaches to a vast
array of judicial propositions.
The inclusive definition of precedent is on display when the Supreme
Court defers to a wide-ranging doctrinal framework in applying the Bill of
Rights against the states.18 It is on display when the Court’s detailed warnings for criminal suspects receive deference in subsequent adjudication.19
And it is on display when a federal appellate judge suggests that Supreme
Court dicta foreclose her independent interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.20
In some situations, broad interpretations of precedent are arguably consistent with the black-letter definition of judicial holdings as propositions
that are “necessary” to a case’s result.21 But that fact does not justify the
inclusive paradigm of precedent. It simply demonstrates the ambiguity that
resides within the terms “holding” and “dicta,” terms that create far greater
potential for mischief than illumination. The dangers are exacerbated when,
as is often the case, the terms are deployed in isolation from the underlying
principles that give them meaning. The proper question is not whether a
particular judicial statement is better described as holding or dictum.
Rather, it is why holdings should be entitled to deference—and why dicta
should not—in the first place.
This question cannot be answered in the abstract. It is impossible to
provide a complete account of precedential scope without adopting, either
overtly or implicitly, a specific vision of the function of precedent and the
nature of the judicial role. Such a vision will be informed by matters of
interpretive methodology and constitutional theory. For jurists and commentators who view the Constitution as imposing strict limits on judicial
lawmaking, the inclusive paradigm of precedent creates problems by infusing much of what judges say with constraining force. The same is true for
those who view the Constitution’s original meaning as paramount to judicial precedent in all but the narrowest circumstances. But for others, the
virtues of guiding lower courts and respecting prior judicial pronouncements serve to justify the inclusive paradigm.22
Perspectives on the scope of precedent are thus intertwined with deeper
principles of interpretation and adjudication. A judicial opinion has no intrinsic meaning. Its effect depends on the interpretive lens through which it
is viewed. Think of it like a quantum theory of precedent: the interpretive
sympathies of the particular observer end up determining what is binding
L. Rev. 219, 221 (2010) (arguing that “too often lawyers argue for, and judges treat, extraneous statements made in a prior case—that is, dicta—as holding”).
18. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
19. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); infra Section I.C.3.
20. See Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 410–11 (4th Cir. 2005) (Motz,
J., concurring in the judgment).
21. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996).
22. See infra Section III.C.
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and what is not.23 A court cannot assess whether a flawed decision should be
overruled without consulting interpretive touchstones to determine how
problematic it would be to leave the offending decision on the books.24 Similarly, a court cannot fully evaluate whether a decision applies to a new dispute without asking questions such as whether the Supreme Court should
play an active role as the federal judiciary’s manager; whether the lower
courts are bound to act as the Supreme Court’s faithful agents rather than
charting their own course; and whether the Constitution places meaningful
limits on the power of today’s judges to constrain those of tomorrow.
Many of these questions draw on the unique role and structure of the
federal judiciary. This Article accordingly focuses on the treatment of Supreme Court precedents by subsequent federal courts, including the Supreme Court itself. Properly analyzing the implications of precedent requires
attention to specific institutional features that are not shared by all courts.
To take just one example, the argument for interpreting Supreme Court decisions broadly may be stronger with respect to federal appellate courts than
it is with respect to state supreme courts, because the constraint of state
courts raises unique issues for the federal–state balance.25 More generally,
the intractable nature of debates over precedential scope arises in part from
their formulation in abstract terms. Examining the ramifications of constraint in light of the specific characteristics of particular courts makes the
puzzles of precedent at once more manageable and more responsive to
context.
This Article proceeds in five stages. Part I examines the treatment of
precedential scope as a matter of contemporary federal practice. It explains
how the prevailing definition of precedent is capacious and inclusive, imbuing a wide range of judicial propositions with binding effect. Part II adds
precision by exploring the inclusive paradigm’s assumptions and
boundaries.
Having provided a descriptive and analytical account of the scope of
precedent, the Article turns in Part III to evaluating the inclusive paradigm
and comparing it with a more restrictive approach. That project requires
engaging with fundamental interpretive choices and constitutional understandings, both of which determine how the costs and benefits of precedential constraint should be perceived and weighed against one another.
Drawing on the relationship between precedential scope and interpretive theory, Part IV offers two proposals for doctrinal reform. The initial
23. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1989) (“The deeper philosophical insight
underlying the Heisenberg Principle is . . . that the observer is never really separate from the
system being studied, even though the contrary presumption might occasionally be a useful
abstraction.”).
24. Lash, supra note 3, at 1439 (noting the importance of “a normative theory that
weighs the costs of interpretive error against the benefits of following precedent”). See generally Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91
Tex. L. Rev. 1843 (2013).
25. See infra Section V.B.
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goal is enhanced analytical transparency regarding the scope of precedent—
a development that becomes plausible once the role of interpretive theory
and constitutional understandings comes into focus. The second, more ambitious proposal seeks not just transparency but analytical consistency, combined with recognition of the serious challenges posed by individual judges’
interpretive vacillation and by the Supreme Court’s institutional reluctance
to commit itself to any unified method of legal interpretation. While the
Court’s interpretive pluralism is a formidable obstacle to developing an effective doctrine of stare decisis, the pursuit of transparency and consistency
is a promising, although imperfect and incomplete, means of improving the
existing jurisprudence.
Finally, Part V looks beyond the Supreme Court to explain how debates
over the scope of precedent depend on the unique structural characteristics
of the courts that issue decisions and the courts that apply them.
I. Precedent in Practice
It is a truth universally acknowledged that a judge who is asked to resolve a thorny dispute must be presented with competing arguments from
precedent.26 One party will claim that the body of relevant case law demands, or at least strongly suggests, a certain outcome. The opposing party
will contend that the proper inference from precedent is actually quite the
contrary. And so the meaning of precedent will be placed before the judge
for resolution.27
A. From Persuasion to Deference
The role of precedent depends on two concepts that are interrelated but
analytically distinct. The first is precedential scope, which determines
whether a prior judicial statement applies to the dispute presently under
consideration. The second is precedential strength, which determines how
much deference is owed to prior statements that are, in fact, applicable. This
Article’s primary concern is the threshold matter of scope. Before turning to
that issue, however, I offer a brief introduction to the nature and import of
precedential strength.
A judge is always free to consider a prior statement for its persuasive
value, even if she regards the statement as dispensable dicta. Looking to a
proposition for its persuasive force is a means of vetting the merits of a legal
argument. A judge who considers a proposition’s persuasive value does not
thereby defer to its author. Nor does she endorse a presumption in favor of
26. Cf. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice 1 (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1923) (1813).
27. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193 (D. Utah 2013) (“Both
parties argue that the reasoning in Windsor requires judgment in their favor.”); see also Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 579 (1987) (“The task of a theory of precedent is
to explain, in a world in which a single event may fit into many different categories, how and
why some assimilations are plausible and others are not.”).
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the status quo. She simply seeks a proper understanding of the relevant arguments before reaching her own independent conclusion.28 A judicial proposition that is treated as persuasive carries no force beyond that which
might accrue to an amicus curiae brief or a scholarly treatise.29 If the proposition is correct, it will carry the day. If it is incorrect, it will fall by the
wayside.
A subsequent judge defers to a prior decision only when she contemplates the possibility of abiding by the decision despite the fact that its reasoning does not persuade her. The potential explanations for deference are
manifold. It may be that the judge has some doubt—or, perhaps, humility—
about her ability to reach the correct result on the merits, leading her to
subordinate her best understanding to the conclusions of prior tribunals.30
Alternatively, the judge may be quite confident that the applicable precedent
is incorrect. Yet she may still choose to abide by the precedent based on her
belief that overruling it would create substantial transition costs and upset
settled expectations.31 Whatever her motivation, the judge defers by treating
a precedent as though it draws authority from sources other than its logical
appeal.
Deference is not an all-or-nothing proposition. The strength of deference may depend on the type of case, as with the Supreme Court’s practice
of giving extra insulation to (most) statutory precedents.32 The strength of
deference may also vary based on a court’s hierarchical rank; the Supreme
Court’s decisions are absolutely binding on inferior federal courts but susceptible to overruling by the Supreme Court itself.33 In all events, deference
to precedent means that future judges might—not necessarily will, but
might—abide by a prior decision despite disagreeing with its rationale. The
corollary is that a precedent can be “binding” in the sense of requiring presumptive deference even if countervailing factors may trigger the precedent’s
overruling.
Through this understanding of persuasion and deference, the relationship between precedential strength and precedential scope becomes clear. If
28. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If one has been persuaded by another, so that one’s judgment accords
with the other’s, there is no room for deferral—only agreement.”).
29. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931, 1943 (2008)
(“[I]f authority is genuinely at work, then the agent who accepts the authoritativeness of a
directive need not be persuaded by the substantive reasons that might support the same
conclusion.”).
30. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution 208 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed.,
2008) (connecting deference to precedent with judicial humility).
31. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1989) (“If the
decision in the precedent case has generated expectations of similar future decisions on which
people have relied . . . and a decision that the [current] court would otherwise find correct
would dash those expectations, then the opposite decision may in fact be the correct one.”).
32. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation . . . .”).
33. See infra Section III.A.1.
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a given precedent is broad enough to cover a newly arising dispute, it will
exert constraining force that exceeds its persuasiveness. Unlike a merely persuasive proposition, a binding proposition requires a judge to show something more than disagreement in order to justify departing from the past. It
is the definition of a precedent’s scope of applicability that makes the strength
of deference relevant to the analysis. The corollary is that, when judges interpret precedent broadly, the strength of deference becomes crucial to determining what is settled and what is open for debate.
B. Starting Points: The Holding–Dicta Distinction
The classic account of precedential scope revolves around a stark dichotomy. Judicial holdings receive deference in future cases. Dicta, by contrast,
have no constraining force and are relevant only to the extent that their
reasoning is persuasive.34 Chief Justice Marshall made this point nearly two
centuries ago in Cohens v. Virginia, noting that, while expressions that “go
beyond the case . . . may be respected,” they do not control “in a subsequent
suit when the very point is presented for decision.”35
The same principle is evident in the Supreme Court’s modern case
law.36 The Court’s decisions regularly confirm the nonbinding nature of
dicta.37 By way of illustration, consider the Court’s recent echo of Cohens in
noting that “we are not necessarily bound by dicta should more complete
argument demonstrate that the dicta is not correct.”38 Consider, too, Justice
Scalia’s assertion that, even if dicta are “repeated” over time, they are “not
owed stare decisis weight,”39 as well as his statement that dicta are “binding
upon neither” the Supreme Court nor the inferior courts.40 Whenever a

34. For an account of the various ways in which authorities can be persuasive, see Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1
(2013). “Persuasive authority has four distinct but related components: (1) persuasion by reasons, (2) persuasion by epistemic authority, (3) persuasion by predictive authority, and (4)
persuasion by legitimating authority.” Id. at 38.
35. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 339 (1821).
36. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012)
(calling the Cohens language a “sage observation”); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,
363 (2006) (“For the reasons stated by Chief Justice Marshall in [Cohens], we are not bound to
follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated.”).
37. See, e.g., Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001) (noting that
“dicta ‘may be followed if sufficiently persuasive’ but are not binding” (quoting Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935))); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall
P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) (noting the Supreme Court’s “customary refusal to be bound by
dicta”).
38. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013).
39. Gonzales v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
40. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1884 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869 (2011) (“We

188

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 113:179

court treats a proposition as undeserving of deference because it was beyond
“the narrow point decided,” the holding–dicta distinction is at work.41
The Supreme Court has described the holding of a case as including its
“final disposition” in addition to “the preceding determinations ‘necessary to
that result.’”42 Holdings must also be grounded in “the adjudicated facts”;43
hypothetical statements are the stuff of dicta. On this view, precedential effect attaches to the application of a targeted legal rule to a discrete set of
facts that were actually presented in the underlying dispute. It is true, of
course, that Supreme Court opinions are full of logical arguments and prescriptions for the future. As Justice Stevens has noted, “[v]irtually every one
of the Court’s opinions announcing a new application of a constitutional
principle contains some explanatory language that is intended to provide
guidance to lawyers and judges in future cases.”44 Even so, it is important to
recognize that the distinction between holdings and dicta would deny deference to unnecessary and hypothetical statements even when they were
clearly intended to guide future courts.45 Such statements may or may not be
convincing on the merits, but in no event would they warrant deference
beyond their persuasive force.
The enduring salience of the holding–dicta distinction is visible whenever the Supreme Court marginalizes its past expressions by depicting them
as peripheral or overbroad. A useful illustration is the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Alvarez.46 In Alvarez, which struck down a federal
statute that prohibited fabricated claims of military commendation, a plurality of justices determined that false statements possess some value in the eyes
of the First Amendment.47 Before reaching that conclusion, the plurality had
to confront language in the Court’s prior opinions supporting the contrary
view that false claims possess no intrinsic value.48 The plurality downplayed
now find that this dictum was ill-considered, and we decline to follow it.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 n.25 (2008) (“It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted
dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.”).
41. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935).
42. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 n.4 (2001) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996)) (emphasis in Tyler); cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 1177 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “obiter dictum” to mean a judicial comment “that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)”).
43. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1994).
44. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 79 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
45. See Schauer, supra note 27, at 580 (noting that, “[i]n classical legal theory, articulated
characterizations are often considered mere dicta”).
46. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
47. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546–47 (plurality opinion).
48. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements
of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”).
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the problematic language as consisting of “isolated statements” uttered in a
different context.49 According to the plurality, all the opinions that had described false statements as valueless involved “defamation, fraud, or some
other legally cognizable harm . . . such as an invasion of privacy or the costs
of vexatious litigation.”50 There was no justification for deference outside of
those situations, regardless of whether the Court’s previous language suggested a general principle that false speech is valueless. By drawing a rigid
line between fact-intensive rulings and nonbinding judicial exposition, the
Alvarez plurality highlighted the importance of sorting holdings from dicta.
To the same effect is United States v. Stevens, a case dealing with a criminal statute aimed at depictions of animal cruelty.51 In defending the statute’s
constitutionality, the U.S. Solicitor General pressed an argument grounded
in cost–benefit analysis: because depictions of animal cruelty have meager
social value but impose significant social harm, they should be treated as a
categorical exception to First Amendment protection.52 The Solicitor General’s argument drew on previous cases in which the Court had described
this type of cost–benefit analysis as relevant to constitutional protection.53
But Stevens dismissed the Court’s prior acceptance of cost–benefit analysis
as merely “descriptive.”54 According to Stevens, the Court’s language linking
First Amendment coverage to cost–benefit analysis was window dressing.
The language did not “set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter.”55 In this way, the Court framed its new approach to identifying categorical exceptions (which is expressly tied to historical practice rather than to
the weighing of costs and benefits) as familiar despite the fact that it clashed
with the language of decisions that preceded it.56
Similar dynamics are evident in the Supreme Court’s most famous application of stare decisis, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.57 When the Court first addressed the constitutional implications of
abortion in Roe v. Wade, it ventured far beyond the facts at hand to articulate an elaborate framework for evaluating abortion regulations based on the
trimester of pregnancy.58 That framework was not an essential statement or
49. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2544 (plurality opinion).
50. Id. at 2545.
51. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
52. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
53. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (“[I]t is not rare that a
content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case
adjudication is required.”).
54. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 1584–86.
57. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
58. 410 U.S. 113, 163–66 (1973).
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an application of law to specific facts presented for adjudication. It was an
abstract and generalized set of instructions for handling future cases.
In Casey, the Court preserved Roe’s “central holding” that “viability
marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”59
At the same time, a plurality of justices jettisoned the trimester framework,
which they did “not consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.”60
That distinction, which Justice Scalia criticized as a “new, keep-what-youwant-and-throw-away-the-rest version” of stare decisis, reflected a view that
core holdings are entitled to very different treatment than peripheral
exposition.61
The lower federal courts also furnish some notable support for policing
the line between holdings and dicta. Judge Boggs has written that “the holding/dicta distinction demands that we consider binding only that which was
necessary to resolve the question before the [Supreme] Court.”62 Likewise,
Judge Leval has contended that Supreme Court dicta are “not law.”63 In his
estimation, the consequence is not merely that inferior-court judges should
feel free to depart from such dicta. The implications go further: judges “may
not treat the Supreme Court’s dictum as dispositive.”64 A judge who does so
“fail[s] to discharge” her “responsibility to deliberate on and decide the
question which needs to be decided.”65 Judge Aldisert has taken a similar
position, reasoning that “[t]he common-law tradition requires starting with
a narrow holding and, then . . . either applying it or not applying it to
subsequent facts.”66 Examples like these demonstrate the continued relevance of the classic holding–dicta distinction to American jurisprudence.
C. Precedential Breadth at the Supreme Court
Given the persistence of the holding–dicta distinction, one might infer
that the scope of precedent is commonly defined in a narrow fashion. After
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
60. Id. at 873 (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
62. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 787 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs, J., dissenting), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
63. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1249, 1274 (2006).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1250; cf. United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (“What is
at stake in distinguishing holding from dictum is that a dictum is not authoritative. It is the
part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject.”).
66. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and
When Do We Kill It?, 17 Pepp. L. Rev. 605, 610 (1990); cf. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig.,
681 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[E]ven if the . . . dicta were to have the meaning the panel ascribes to it, it is nonetheless still
dicta.”).
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all, an insistence on separating holdings from dicta can be understood as
reflecting discomfort with a broad conception of precedent.
In practice, however, the scope of precedent tends to be remarkably capacious. We can observe this phenomenon both at the Supreme Court,
which is the topic of this Section, and in the lower federal courts, which are
the topic of the next.
In examining the Supreme Court’s broad conception of precedential
scope, it will be instructive to consider the Court’s treatment of four categories of propositions: (1) unmistakable dicta; (2) doctrinal frameworks; (3)
codifying statements; and (4) supporting rationales.
1. Unmistakable Dicta
The Supreme Court sometimes cites its prior articulations of legal principles even while acknowledging those articulations as dicta.67 Such citations
do not prove that dicta receive binding force, but they do suggest that the
Court ascribes some significance to the fact that a principle has a historical
lineage—in other words, that the Court values precedent qua precedent—
even when the principle was expressed in dicta.68
Occasionally, the justices offer more explicit indications that dicta can
carry binding force beyond their persuasive appeal. In Kappos v. Hyatt, the
Supreme Court considered the treatment of new evidence in civil actions
contesting the denial of patent applications.69 One of the precedents the
Court discussed was Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, which described
civil actions as independent of the initial patent application, with the consequence that new evidence could be presented in subsequent litigation.70 The
Kappos Court characterized Butterworth’s pronouncements as worthy of deference despite acknowledging that the relevant “discussion was not strictly
necessary to Butterworth’s holding.”71 The Court explained that, although
the pertinent statements in Butterworth were technically dicta, they were
“not the kind of ill-considered dicta that we are inclined to ignore.”72 To the
contrary, the Butterworth discussion reflected a “careful[ ] examin[ation]” of

67. See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 871 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have strongly intimated in
other decisions (albeit in dictum) that private entities can rarely, if ever, intervene in original
actions involving the apportionment of interstate waterways.”); Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct.
1446, 1455 (2009) (“We disavowed this statement . . . albeit in dicta . . . .”).
68. On the distinctive purposes for which judges can use precedent, see Kozel, supra note
24, at 1849–55.
69. 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012).
70. Kappos, 132 S. Ct. at 1698 (discussing Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112
U.S. 50 (1884)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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the statutory context and inferior-court decisions.73 The Court had also “reiterated Butterworth’s well-reasoned interpretation . . . in three later cases.”74
The dicta were therefore entitled to some degree of deference.
Kappos serves as a starting point in probing the barrier between binding
holdings and dispensable dicta. It is difficult to discern precisely how much
deference the Butterworth dicta received, because the Kappos Court also
found them persuasive on the merits.75 But the central takeaway is the recognition of distinctions among different types of dicta in light of considerations such as their evident degree of deliberation. By distinguishing “illconsidered dicta” from dicta that ought not be “ignor[ed],” Kappos offers a
subtle but significant challenge to the holding–dicta dichotomy. The case
implies that even dicta can be worthy of deference under the right
circumstances.
A comparable example comes from Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.76 In Parents
Involved, the Supreme Court considered the authority of school districts to
make school assignments based on factors including students’ race. The
Court struck down the relevant districts’ practices as violating the Equal
Protection Clause.77
Justice Breyer dissented on behalf of himself and three others, criticizing
the treatment of precedent in a portion of the Court’s opinion that was
joined by a plurality of justices. In particular, Justice Breyer emphasized a
statement from the 1970 case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education78 that arguably expressed approval of race-based enrollment decisions made “in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society.”79
The Parents Involved plurality had characterized that part of Swann as inapposite, outmoded, and nonbinding dicta.80 On the dicta point, Justice Breyer
conceded that the statement “was not a technical holding in the case.”81 But
he countered that the Swann Court “set forth its view prominently in an
important opinion joined by all nine Justices, knowing that it would be read
and followed throughout the Nation.”82 In addition, the statement had come
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. (describing the Butterworth approach as “well-reasoned”).
76. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
77. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 710–11.
78. 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1970).
79. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at
16) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 131, 137 (2006) (arguing that Swann “clearly endorsed the
proposition that school officials have the authority to seek racial integration voluntarily”).
80. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 737–38 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 831.
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to enjoy “wide acceptance in the legal culture.”83 And “it reflected a consensus that had already emerged among state and lower federal courts.”84 The
plurality’s “rigid distinctions between holdings and dicta” were therefore insufficient.85 If the plurality wished to reconsider the statement in Swann, it
should have acknowledged an obligation to “explain to the courts and to the
Nation why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before.”86
Justice Breyer’s language suggests that he regarded the Swann dicta as
carrying something more than persuasive effect. In his view, it was not
enough to ask whether the position taken in Swann was convincing on the
merits. The statement deserved a degree of respect above and beyond its
soundness. This status owed in part to the perceived intention of the issuing
Court, and in part to the role that the statement came to play over time.
Dicta or not, the statement constituted “authoritative legal guidance.”87 Departing from it accordingly required a better answer to the question, “[W]hy
change?”88
As with the Court’s opinion in Kappos, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents
Involved implies that, in certain situations, it is appropriate to defer to judicial statements even if they fall into the category of unnecessary dicta. Justice
Breyer advanced the same basic position in a previous case, asserting in 2004
that dicta with a “lengthy history” can be entitled to deference if they are
“the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law.”89 Similar sentiments appear in a 2008 opinion from Justice
Souter contending that, even if a particular statement was technically a dictum, “it was dictum well considered, and it stated the view of five Members
of this Court.”90 The common theme is that not all dicta are created equal;
some are entitled to precedential weight.
2. Doctrinal Frameworks
By their very nature, doctrinal frameworks sweep far beyond the facts at
hand to address other situations not concurrently before the court. Yet while
Supreme Court justices occasionally refuse to accept the validity of doctrinal
frameworks with which they disagree,91 in many cases the frameworks are
83. Id. at 823 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 827.
85. Id. at 831.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. This language is drawn from a recent dissent by Justice Breyer dealing with shifts in
administrative policy. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1832 (2009)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 198 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 799 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring).
91. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting opinion in BMW of
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taken as given, with the real differences concerning their application to particular sets of facts.92 Disputes over the Commerce Clause tend to accept the
relevance of asking whether “economic activity substantially affects commerce.”93 Disputes over racial classifications generally assume that the appropriate question is whether the government has narrowly tailored its
regulations to serve a compelling interest.94 Disputes over the Ex Post Facto
Clause give canonical force to Justice Chase’s four categories of prohibited
laws as articulated in Calder v. Bull.95 Disputes over administrative law accept the two-step protocol set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.96 as appropriate for a large chunk of cases.97 In
these and scores of other situations, generalized doctrinal frameworks exert
binding force.
An illuminating example recently arose in the context of firearm regulation. In the Slaughter-House Cases, decided in 1873, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause98 as

North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598–599 (1996), that the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive
damages.”).
92. See Caminker, supra note 43, at 14 (1994) (“[J]urists generally agree that legal rules
or doctrines invoked by a judge to justify her disposition of a case qualify for precedential
status.”).
93. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”), with id. at 615–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the commerce power “encompasses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate
commerce” and pointing out that “to speak of ‘substantial effect’ rather than ‘significant effect’ would make no difference in this case”). See also id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In
an appropriate case, I believe that we must further reconsider our ‘substantial effects’ test with
an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce
Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”).
94. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that racial “classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental
interests”), with id. at 378 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court that, ‘in the
limited circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is permissible,’ the government must
ensure that its means are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”).
95. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (“As this case turns
on the scope of the doctrine enshrined in Chevron, we begin with a description of that case’s
now-canonical formulation.”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1817
(2010) (“Chevron is precedential for much more than its mere substantive (environmental law)
holding; far more significant has been the methodology it sets forth for all future potential
deference cases.” (footnote omitted)).
98. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
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protecting “only those rights ‘which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, or its laws.’”99 That opinion was eventually
characterized by many as undermining the argument that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause incorporates the Bill of Rights against the states.100 The
Court’s eventual response was the “selective incorporation” of most of the
Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.101 The
inquiry became whether a particular right is “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice.”102
The validity of selective incorporation under the Due Process Clause
reemerged in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which involved local laws banning the possession of handguns in the home. The Court had recently invalidated a comparable District of Columbia law as violating the Second
Amendment.103 The question in McDonald was whether the same analysis
should apply to state and local laws. The challengers asked the Court to
depart from the practice of selective incorporation under the Due Process
Clause and to rule that the Second Amendment should be applied to state
and local governments via the Privileges or Immunities Clause.104 But a plurality of justices declined the invitation. The plurality conceded that “many
legal scholars dispute the correctness of the narrow Slaughter-House interpretation.”105 Yet it chose to continue down the path of Due Process Clause
analysis.106
The McDonald opinion evinces a broad understanding of precedential
scope. The Supreme Court’s selective incorporation doctrine is a wide-ranging framework designed to apply to cases dealing with a host of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the McDonald plurality treated the framework as
entitled to deference despite forceful criticisms—criticisms that the plurality
did not attempt to rebut—of its soundness on the merits. The McDonald
99. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028 (2010) (quoting the SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)).
100. Cf. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 394 n.80 (2011) (“[M]any
constitutional scholars believe that the Court improperly failed to interpret the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applying the Bill of Rights to state and
local action.”). But see Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges
and Immunities of American Citizenship 264–65 (2014) (arguing that it was not the
Court’s approach in the Slaughter-House Cases, but rather its subsequent opinion in United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), that led to a constrained interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
101. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034.
102. Id. (emphasis omitted).
103. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the “ban
on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate selfdefense”).
104. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028.
105. Id. at 3029.
106. Id. at 3030–31.
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opinion thus stands as another endorsement of the view that the Court possesses considerable authority to articulate generalized doctrinal frameworks
that will be imbued with precedential effect.
Even some cases that ostensibly suggest a more restrictive understanding
of precedent ultimately accept the constraining force of doctrinal
frameworks. Recall the example of Casey, which preserved the constitutional
right to abortion while rejecting the trimester framework set forth in Roe v.
Wade.107 Casey drew a clear line between Roe’s central holding and its other
constituent elements, but the plurality did not stop there. Instead, it embraced a different doctrinal framework—one focused on whether a regulation places an “undue burden” on abortion rights108—as the proper
analytical rubric to replace the disfavored trimester approach. In describing
its preferred rubric, the plurality also explained that “[r]egulations which do
no more than create a structural mechanism” for “express[ing] profound
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted,” so long as “they are not a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”109 In
effect, the Casey plurality treated Roe’s trimester framework as unworthy of
deference while endorsing an alternative framework to guide future courts.
What began as a relatively restrictive approach to precedent gave way to a far
more inclusive paradigm.
3. Codifying Statements
Related to the crafting of broad doctrinal frameworks is the Supreme
Court’s practice of couching some of its directives in remarkably elaborate
terms. There is no better illustration of such a “codifying decision[ ]”110 than
Miranda v. Arizona, which announced a detailed litany of warnings to serve
as “procedural safeguards” during custodial interrogations of suspected
criminals.111 As Judge Easterbrook has noted, the Miranda warnings theoretically “could be disregarded on the ground that Ernesto Miranda had not
been given any warning, so the Court could not pronounce on the consequences of giving three but not four of the warnings on its list.”112 And yet
the Supreme Court has treated the warnings as representing a binding mandate of criminal procedure.113
107. See supra Section I.B.
108. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 877.
110. Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 730 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
111. 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
112. Faheem-El, 841 F.2d at 730.
113. See id.; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”); id. at 435 (The
Miranda guidelines “established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the
suspect with four warnings.”).
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Like doctrinal frameworks, codifying statements float free of the factual
context surrounding any particular dispute. But even though they are broad
statements of guiding principles, they can exert binding force as a matter of
federal practice. Once again, the effect is to expand the constraining power
of the Supreme Court’s decisions.
4. Supporting Rationales
The reasons offered to support a judicial ruling are distinct from the
ruling itself. Some conceptions of precedent are broad enough to treat supportive reasoning as carrying binding force.114 On other accounts, judicial
rationales should not receive deference when they are exported to new factual contexts that were not before the issuing court at the time of its decision. The latter position reflects the belief that “under the doctrine of stare
decisis a case is important only for what it decides—for the ‘what,’ not for
the ‘why,’ and not for the ‘how.’”115
The debate has been with us for decades. In 1928, Professor Oliphant
lamented that “we are well on our way toward a shift from following decisions to following so-called principles, from stare decisis to . . . stare dictis.”116
Justice Kennedy took a contrary position some sixty years later in stating
that “the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules
of law.”117
That latter view is most consistent with the Supreme Court’s characterization of its contemporary practice. The Court has stated that a “well-established rationale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier
decisions” is entitled to stare-decisis effect.118 As explained above, the Court
has not been uniform in its solicitude for underlying rationales, and there
are notable examples in which articulated reasons are denied deference.119
But in other cases, rationales continue to exert binding force.120

114. See Leval, supra note 63, at 1256 (“If the court’s judgment and the reasoning which
supports it would remain unchanged, regardless of the proposition in question, that proposition . . . is superfluous to the decision and is dictum.” (emphasis added)).
115. In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (making the quoted statement in the
context of circuit precedent); Aldisert, supra note 66, at 607.
116. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 72 (1928).
117. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 490 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Although technically dicta, the discussion [of a relevant statute in a previous decision] was
an important part of the Court’s rationale for the result it reached, and accordingly is entitled
to greater weight than the Court gives it today.”).
118. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996).
119. See supra Section I.B.
120. E.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 66.
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D. Precedential Breadth in the Lower Federal Courts
The inclusive view of precedent is even more prevalent in the lower
federal courts. This Part has identified prominent federal judges who have
endorsed a fairly restrictive approach to precedent.121 Yet the attitude exemplified by those judges is far from universal.122 As Professor Schauer observes, it is often true that, within “interpretive arenas below the Supreme
Court, one good quote is worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.”123
From the determined efforts of lower-court judges to “parse Supreme Court
opinions in seeking to identify applicable doctrine,” it can seem as if there is
“little meaningful difference between the effect of a congressional statute[ ]
and a new doctrinal rule adopted by the Court.”124
Many lower courts have described Supreme Court statements as entitled
to deference even when those statements were made in dicta.125 The strength
of deference varies from court to court. Some lower courts describe Supreme Court dicta as akin to Supreme Court holdings, such that dicta can
demand adherence in what would otherwise “be an extremely close case.”126
Other opinions contemplate an intermediate degree of deference,127 with
judges asserting that Supreme Court dicta bind “almost as firmly” as holdings.128 Still other courts describe dicta as entitled to “considerable weight”
121. See supra Section I.B.
122. See Caminker, supra note 43, at 75 (“[L]ower courts frequently give considerable, and
sometimes even dispositive, weight to nonbinding but well-considered dicta when addressing
novel legal questions.” (footnotes omitted)); Dorf, supra note 14, at 2026 (“Some lower courts
do not view themselves as bound by a higher court’s dicta, while others take the position that
all considered statements of a higher court are binding.” (footnote omitted)).
123. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 682, 683 (1986) (book review); see also id. (“[I]t is not what the Supreme Court held that matters, but what it said.”).
124. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts,
and the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 967, 994 (2000); see also id. (“[T]he
traditional judicial distinction between dictum and a holding seems to play an increasingly
insignificant role in the Court’s opinions formulating the ‘rule’ that they create, and subsequently in lower courts’ decisions analyzing and applying those rules.”).
125. See, e.g., McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176, 181 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012);
ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2010); Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d
1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006); Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1349–50
(Fed. Cir. 2000); United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Town Sound &
Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 495 n.41 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (noting that while “[c]ourts
generally treat dicta in case law as non-binding . . . [m]ost federal circuits have recognized that
‘by the way’ statements made by the Supreme Court resonate more forcefully than dicta from
other sources”); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute
in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 433, 479 (2012) (“[T]he lower courts . . . tend to treat
the high court’s dicta as quite authoritative, indeed nearly binding.”).
126. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 410 (4th Cir. 2005) (Motz, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
127. See Caminker, supra note 43, at 76 (arguing that “the courts giving significant weight
to dicta make it quite clear that they do not consider dicta to be binding as they do unifiedmajority dispositional rules”).
128. McCoy v. Massachusetts, 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
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but add that “we are not necessarily bound to follow” them.129 Another
court has noted that, while dicta are “not binding,” neither can they be
taken “lightly”—although they may give way in the face of unanticipated
circumstances.130 And the descriptions do not end here; lower courts also
refer to Supreme Court dicta using words like “respect,”131 “great weight,”132
“great deference,”133 and “more appropriate . . . than any test we might
fashion.”134
Statements of this sort, which disavow the treatment of Supreme Court
dicta as unworthy of deference, expressly adopt an inclusive paradigm of
precedent. Rather than being denied any weight beyond their persuasiveness,
Supreme Court dicta receive substantial, and sometimes controlling, deference in the lower courts.135 A recent empirical study by Professor Klein and
Professor Devins underscores this point by confirming the “frequent decisions” among inferior courts “to abide by statements from higher courts
even though they are recognized as dicta.”136 Whatever its merits as a normative matter—an issue that will be taken up in Part III, below—the practice of deferring to dicta provides a final, and striking, piece of evidence for
the inclusive paradigm’s resonance in contemporary practice.
II. Clarifying the Inclusive Paradigm of Precedent
The previous Part explained the ways in which the prevailing approach
to Supreme Court precedent is broadly inclusive. Generalized, sweeping, and
unnecessary propositions commonly exert forward-looking effect in the Supreme Court and lower courts alike.
The crucial normative questions are whether the prevalence of this inclusive paradigm is something to be cheered or lamented, and how the legal
system should respond to the tension between the inclusive paradigm and
the more restrictive definition of precedent that is implied by the classic
holding–dicta distinction. These questions provide the backdrop for the remainder of the Article.
To facilitate the process of normative evaluation, this Part clarifies three
aspects of the inclusive paradigm of precedent. To summarize:
129. United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1975).
130. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics
Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
131. Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989).
132. See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674, 683 (9th Cir.
2004); United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1993).
133. United States v. Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164, 179 (2d Cir. 2012).
134. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 746 n.9 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S.
306 (2003).
135. See Caminker, supra note 43, at 76 (“It is . . . quite clear that courts do not follow
dicta merely because they are moved by the dicta’s intrinsic persuasive force; courts occasionally follow dicta with which they expressly disagree.”).
136. Klein & Devins, supra note 17, at 2044.
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First, the inclusive paradigm is not boundless. Even with the inclusive approach, there remain some judicial propositions that fall beyond the limits
of deference.
Second, the inclusive paradigm is not necessarily binary. It is possible to
conceptualize the inclusive paradigm as a continuum in which the strength
of precedent varies according to the centrality of a given judicial proposition. That possibility does not eliminate the need for investigating the underlying justifications for precedential strength; to the contrary, it makes
the need more acute.
Third, the inclusive paradigm does not focus on the holding–dicta distinction. Certain broad propositions that receive deference from future courts
may plausibly be characterized as holdings that were logically necessary to
the decisions that announced them. But characterizing a statement as a
judicial holding does not end the inquiry into its binding force. There remains the deeper question of why a statement’s nature as holding or dicta
should determine its forward-looking effect.

A. Inclusive Versus Infinite
The inclusive paradigm of precedent need not imply that everything a
prior court says will have constraining force in future adjudication. Despite
permitting precedents to sweep broadly, the inclusive paradigm is compatible with the view that some judicial propositions are unworthy of deference.
In particular, a precedent’s scope of applicability may take account of
the difference between deliberate and offhand language. Thus, in the Kappos
case discussed above, it was important to the Supreme Court that its predecessor Court appeared to have “carefully examined” an issue before opining
in dicta.137 Where indicia of deliberation are apparent, courts naturally are
more inclined to credit past statements despite their nonessential or generalized nature.138 Relevant factors include “earmarks of deliberative thought
purposefully expressed”139 such as “the sophistication of [the] analysis” and
“verbal cues as to the author’s commitment to the idea[s].”140 Conversely,
where judicial utterances are entirely disconnected from the facts at hand,
“made casually and without analysis,” or “uttered in passing without due
consideration of the alternatives,”141 deference may be improper even under
the inclusive paradigm. The same may be true when statements are “buried
137. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1699 (2012).
138. See, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“This is not
subordinate clause, negative pregnant, devoid-of-analysis, throw-away kind of dicta. It is well
thought out, thoroughly reasoned, and carefully articulated analysis by the Supreme Court
describing the scope of one of its own decisions.”).
139. United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1993).
140. Caminker, supra note 43, at 47.
141. United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (opinion of
Kozinski, J.).
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in a footnote” rather than prominently announced.142 The simple point is
that, notwithstanding its breadth, even the inclusive paradigm has limits.
B. Dichotomy Versus Continuum
The inclusive paradigm is compatible with the view that the strength of
precedent is a fluid continuum rather than a binary proposition. For example, it may be that, while nonessential statements or broad generalizations
warrant some deference under the inclusive paradigm, they do not warrant
the same level of deference that is accorded to statements closely tethered to
the adjudicated facts. Several federal courts of appeals adopt this approach
by describing Supreme Court dicta as entitled to a reduced level of deference
as compared with the Court’s holdings.143
We might understand the Supreme Court’s treatment of its own dicta as
reflecting a similar sentiment. Most dicta receive no deference from the
Court, but some—such as dicta that are expressed unequivocally and with
evident deliberation—receive at least a measure of deference beyond their
persuasive value, even if they do not enjoy the stronger deference reserved
for holdings.144
The puzzle is why a jurist would opt for such a continuum-based model
rather than a binary approach to precedent. There are several potential answers. Perhaps the judge is primarily concerned about error costs and believes that, although nonessential statements carry greater risks of error than
essential statements, the effect is gradual as one moves away from a decision’s core and toward its conceptual outskirts.145 Or perhaps the judge accepts the need for superior courts to guide inferior courts but believes that
the utility of guidance tends to decrease—again, gradually—for propositions
that are closer to a precedent’s periphery than its core.146 As explained below, the validity of these arguments depends on underlying issues of interpretive methodology and constitutional theory. But regardless of how the
underlying debates are resolved, the inclusive paradigm neither requires nor
forecloses the possibility that different types of propositions may receive different levels of deference. The inclusive paradigm demands only that a wide
array of propositions receive some deference beyond their persuasive value.147

142. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 574 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord Hohn v.
United States, 524 U.S. 236, 259–60 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
relying on “mere dictum . . . (and dictum in a footnote, at that)”).
143. See supra Section I.D.
144. See supra Section I.C.1.
145. See infra Section IV.B.
146. See infra Section IV.B.
147. Cf. Schauer, supra note 29, at 1943 (“[I]f an agent is genuinely persuaded of some
conclusion because she has come to accept the substantive reasons offered for that conclusion
by someone else, then authority has nothing to do with it.”).
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C. Superficial Labels Versus Theoretical Drivers
The point of studying the inclusive paradigm is not to determine
whether the various judicial statements that receive binding effect in contemporary practice are properly labeled as “holdings” under some definition
of that term.148 Even if a doctrinal framework or sweeping rationale is characterized as necessary to the decision that contains it, there remains the
question of whether the proposition should bind future courts. The answer
to that question is exogenous to the holding–dicta distinction. It requires an
appeal to something deeper.
In cases where the deeper explanations for deference are either missing
altogether or so undertheorized as to remain opaque, judges are exposed to
charges of invoking the language of precedent to paper over “stealth” machinations149 and “result-oriented expedient[s].”150 To draw on Justice Scalia’s
dissent in United States v. Windsor, there arises a concern that the only real
constraint is a court’s “sense of what it can get away with.”151 This is not to
say that there is no internal logic to the treatment of precedent; only that, if
such logic exists, it lingers below the surface of judicial exposition.152 My aim
in the following Parts is to bring that logic—and its implications—out into
the open.
III. Reconceptualizing Precedential Scope
Bearing in mind the foregoing description of the inclusive paradigm of
precedent, we can turn to the projects of normative evaluation (in this Part)
and doctrinal reform (in the next).
A. Distinguishing the Horizontal and Vertical Spheres
To construct a normative account of precedential scope, we must first
distinguish between the vertical constraint of lower courts and the horizontal
constraint of the Supreme Court itself.

148. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 14, at 763 (“The precedent has been viewed as limited to
the ‘decision’ on the ‘material facts’ as seen by the precedent court, or the same as seen by the
nonprecedent court; for others, the term means the ‘rules’ formulated by the precedent court;
for still others, the term includes the reasons given for the rules formulated.” (footnotes
omitted)).
149. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1 (2010); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2013) (describing the “Roberts Court’s habit of approaching disfavored
precedents obliquely, gradually undermining them by ‘stealth overruling’ ”).
150. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Cf. Fallon, supra note 14, at 125 (arguing that “matters of background principle”
remain crucial to adjudication even when they are “submerged”).
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1. Vertical Constraint
The principles that define a precedent’s scope of applicability will determine its vertical, or hierarchical,153 power to constrain inferior courts. The
effect is especially pronounced in legal systems, such as the American federal
system, that treat vertical precedent as absolutely binding. As the Supreme
Court regularly reaffirms, it alone has the power to “overrule one of its
precedents.”154 Where a Supreme Court holding applies to a pending dispute, an inferior court has only one available course of action. It must issue
whatever ruling the holding indicates. There is no room for acting on doubts
about the precedent’s soundness or making predictions about the Supreme
Court’s eventual change of heart.155 An inferior court may not even depart
from precedents that the Supreme Court has called into question.156 Absent
a formal overruling, Supreme Court decisions remain indefeasibly binding
on all inferior tribunals; finding a precedent to be controlling brings the
inquiry to its end.157 Like the fateful brigade immortalized by Tennyson, inferior courts faced with controlling precedents are not permitted “to reason
why.”158
As we have seen, the situation is different with respect to Supreme Court
dicta. Inferior courts commonly treat the Supreme Court’s statements as
binding even when those statements are unmistakable dicta.159 Crucially,
however, lower courts at least contemplate the possibility of departing from
Supreme Court dicta in light of countervailing considerations.160 And for
153. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 823–24 (1994).
154. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
237 (1997) (“We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude
our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”).
155. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155, 188
(2006).
156. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t remains ‘this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.’ That is so even
where subsequent decisions or factual developments may appear to have ‘significantly undermined’ the rationale for our earlier holding.” (citation omitted) (quoting State Oil, 522 U.S. at
20, and United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001))). But cf. Minority Television Project,
Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1213 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the actual “lesson is, we must not get ahead of the Supreme Court—unless we’re
right”).
157. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the
Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 843, 848 (1993) (“The oath of constitutional fidelity, required of every public official by Article VI of the Constitution, is transformed, for the ‘inferior’ judge, into a duty to obey the Supreme Court.”).
158. Lord Alfred Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade (1854), reprinted in
Poems of English Heroism 118 (Arthur Compton Auchmuty ed., London, Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trübner & Co. 1895) (“Their’s not to make reply, / Their’s not to reason why, / Their’s
but to do and die.”).
159. See supra Section I.D.
160. See supra Section I.D.
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those (relatively few) courts and judges who do not recognize Supreme
Court dicta as entitled to any deference beyond its persuasiveness, there is
even greater room for blazing a new trail.161
2. Horizontal Constraint
Precedent plays a different role when the context shifts from hierarchical
interactions among tribunals of varying rank to the Supreme Court’s “horizontal” relationship with its past self.
As a doctrinal matter, the pivotal distinction between vertical precedent
and horizontal precedent is that, while the former is absolutely binding, the
latter is not. The Supreme Court regularly emphasizes that horizontal precedent plays a substantial role in its decisionmaking process. Indeed, the Court
has declared that some “special justification” beyond a precedent’s wrongness is required in order to warrant an overruling.162 Yet the Court also cautions that its commitment to precedent is flexible, discretionary, and
rebuttable.163 It claims, and regularly exercises, the power to overrule its
precedents even when they are squarely on point. High-profile examples in
recent years include Citizens United v. FEC164 in the campaign-finance context and Lawrence v. Texas165 in the context of same-sex rights.
Unlike the U.K. House of Lords, which formerly described itself as inexorably committed to follow its precedents,166 the U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged no such duty. Much of the time, it will abide by its past decisions. Other times, it will not.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Constraint
The next step is analyzing the costs and benefits of constraint in both
the vertical and horizontal domains.
1. Potential Benefits of Constraint
In the vertical context, precedential constraint facilitates hierarchical
control, judicial efficiency, and the dissemination of guidance to lower
161. See supra Section I.B.
162. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over
and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.”).
163. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991) (“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent.’ ” (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944))).
164. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
165. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
166. See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (Eng.) (noting, and
“modif[ying],” the House of Lords’s prior practice of refusing to depart from precedent).
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courts.167 When precedents are construed broadly, more issues are removed
from the sphere of reasonable debate. Inferior courts are obliged to treat
those issues as off the table regardless of any substantive reservations. Such a
“maximalist”168 view of precedent can reduce decision costs for subsequent
courts by increasing the number of propositions that must be taken as given.
A judge might bristle at the fact that she has no authority to depart from the
Supreme Court’s utterances, just as a lawyer might lament the fact that inferior courts are powerless to accept an argument in favor of overruling. But
the lack of discretion simplifies proceedings in the inferior courts and
streamlines the resolution of disputes.169
Further, vertical constraint promotes adjudicative uniformity across different courts, jurisdictions, and geographic regions.170 Broad vertical constraint should lead to fewer lower-court anomalies that the Supreme Court
will need to bring into line (or allow to linger). This feature can be particularly attractive when the incidence of superior-court review is infrequent, as
is the case at the U.S. Supreme Court due to its light docket.171 Adjudicative
uniformity is arguably a good in itself as a facilitator of the fair and equitable
treatment of similarly situated parties.172 It is also a means of enhancing the
legal regime’s predictability for litigants, attorneys, and other stakeholders.
The benefits of following precedent are different in the horizontal context, where the Supreme Court grapples with the impact of its own past
decisions. For starters, the control rationale that plays a pivotal role in the
vertical context disappears with respect to horizontal precedent. Although
167. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (“[U]nless we wish
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to
be.”).
168. For a prominent articulation of the concept of maximalism, see Cass R. Sunstein,
One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 9–10 (1999) (defining
maximalists as “those who seek to decide cases in a way that sets broad rules for the future and
that also gives ambitious theoretical justifications for outcomes”).
169. Cf. id. at 48 (“A court that economizes on decision costs for itself may in the process
‘export’ decision costs to other people, including litigants and judges in subsequent cases who
must give content to the law.”).
170. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 153, at 849 (“Both the Constitution’s Framers and
Supreme Court Justices have long recognized the importance of nationally uniform interpretations of federal law.” (footnote omitted)).
171. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell
L. Rev. 1, 56–59 (2009); Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219, 1224 (2012) (“The Court decides fewer cases
per Term now than at any other time in its modern history.”); id. at 1228 (describing the
diminishing docket size between 1940 and 2008).
172. See Caminker, supra note 153, at 852 (“National uniformity of federal law ensures
that courts treat similarly situated litigants equally—a result often considered a hallmark of
fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law.”). But see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1588 (2008) (“Different readings of the same statute should . . .
no more threaten the integrity of the statute than different judicial choices regarding whether
to certify a class, admit hearsay testimony, or grant a non-party’s request for permissive
intervention.”).
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the efficient operation of the judicial system may require some Supreme
Court control over inferior courts, it does not follow that the Supreme
Court justices of today must be able to hem in the justices of tomorrow. In
addition, the shift from vertical to horizontal precedent removes the interest
in national uniformity. In horizontal operation, Supreme Court precedent
does not harmonize conflicting rules that would otherwise exist simultaneously. What is sought is compatibility between the current Court and its
former self.
Rule-of-law implications also take on a unique valence in the context of
horizontal precedent. Invoking a preexisting principle in order to resolve a
hot-button debate can promote the rule of law by emphasizing the primacy
of general, overarching norms that transcend the ideologies and idiosyncrasies of individual justices.173 Deference to past decisions helps to combat the
notion that the law has no essence or principle apart from the personalities
of the justices who happen to occupy the bench at any given time.174 By
deferring to its precedents, a court speaks with one voice.
Beyond these context-dependent implications, the vertical and horizontal axes share certain characteristics with respect to the benefits of precedential constraint. Whether the deferring body is an inferior court or the
Supreme Court, respect for the past can foster stability.175 Justice Brandeis’s
famous statement about the value of allowing the law to “be settled” continues to resonate.176 When adjudicative change is relatively infrequent and
moderate, the disruption of expectations is held in check.177 The stability of
the legal order is bolstered, providing a firmer backdrop for developing informed understandings, planning future affairs, and controlling transition
costs.178 In Justice Breyer’s words, it is this stability that transforms an

173. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2012) (describing the relationship between precedent, generality, and
the rule of law).
174. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921)
(noting the undesirability of a system in which a court’s rulings are too dependent upon its
shifting personnel).
175. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (describing stare decisis as “the
means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a
principled and intelligible fashion”); Fallon, supra note 14, at 66 (“For the Constitution to be
implemented successfully, [its] fabric must be reasonably stable and coherent; . . . doctrine
therefore has a claim to adherence, even by Justices who believe it to be less than optimal.”).
176. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”), overruled on other grounds
by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
177. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)
(“[I]nquiry into reliance counts the cost of a rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who
have relied reasonably on the rule’s continued application.”).
178. See generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 Emory L.J. 1459 (2013).
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aggregation of judicial decisions into a workable and integrated legal
“system.”179
Concerns about stability and predictability are so often recited as to
seem almost commonplace, but that does not diminish their importance. To
the extent that precedents remain substantially in flux, it will be difficult for
lawyers to dispense legal advice and plan sensibly for the future. Courts also
face the grim prospect of endlessly examining previously settled points
rather than focusing on newly arising complexities in litigation. These factors do not necessarily mean that the scope of precedent must be defined
broadly; their ultimate relevance depends on the matters of interpretive theory and constitutional understanding that are addressed below in Section C.
Still, the benefits of stability and predictability loom large over discussions of
precedential effect.180
Finally, note that it would be an oversimplification to conceptualize debates over precedential constraint as a zero-sum game between earlier courts
and later ones. Later courts—whether subsequent iterations of the same
court in the horizontal context or courts of inferior rank in the vertical context—may sometimes prefer that precedents be defined inclusively. One explanation for this preference is the conservation of resources that occurs
when a preexisting proposition is binding upon future tribunals.181 In addition, and contrary to the more common trope of “activist” judges seeking to
impose their ideological preferences on the law, some judges may prefer to
avoid controversy, for reasons ranging from uncertainty about their conclusions to a simple desire to elude the spotlight.182 Those judges may appreciate the fact that their most divisive decisions can plausibly be dressed in the
trappings of precedent.183 While some judges may resent broad constraint,
others will welcome it, at least occasionally.
2. Potential Costs of Constraint
In both vertical and horizontal operation, precedent creates the risk of
entrenching erroneous rules. When today’s court is compelled to accept yesterday’s unsound decision, society incurs a loss from the perpetuation of the
179. See Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work 149 (2010) (“Stability makes
the judicial system and the law itself workable. Without stability the Court’s decisions seem ad
hoc and unpredictable—not part of a system at all.”).
180. Kozel, supra note 178, at 1465 (arguing that one “fixture in the [Supreme] Court’s
discussions of stare decisis is the reliance interest of stakeholders whose lives and livelihoods
are affected by judicial precedent”).
181. E.g., Cardozo, supra note 174, at 149 (justifying deference to precedent based in part
on the need to conserve “the labor of judges”).
182. See supra Section I.A (discussing the link between deference and judicial humility).
183. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1180
(1989) (“The chances that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant duty [of
obstructing the popular will] are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a
firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier cases.”).
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incorrect rule. Rule-of-law costs can also arise from the conscious preservation of judicial gloss that misconstrues the underlying legal authority.184
Abiding by erroneous precedents can even threaten democratic values by
creating distance between judicial interpretations and “the collective judgments that our representatives have authoritatively expressed.”185
The risk of error entrenchment is particularly acute when precedents are
defined inclusively. It is true that numerous propositions are likely to have
received serious consideration notwithstanding the fact that they are generalized, nonessential, or peripheral. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that, in
some cases, the Supreme Court’s affirmative decision to “reach out” to address a counterfactual or ancillary matter will reflect significant deliberation.186 What is more, even the less considered elements of Supreme Court
opinions tend to be thoroughly deliberated in absolute terms. The justices
benefit from the insights of multiple inferior courts and from the efforts of
first-rate attorneys, highly interested stakeholders serving as amici curiae,
and capable law clerks and support staff. These institutional features might
suggest that the Supreme Court’s dicta are likely to be “better decision rules”
than the lower courts would “independently generate” given their heavier
dockets and lighter resources.187
Yet even with extensive deliberation, Supreme Court justices may do a
poor job of fashioning broad rules or opining on issues that are not closely
connected to the facts at hand.188 This concern is featured in the scholarship
of Professor Sunstein, who often (although not invariably)189 advocates an
incremental approach designed to alleviate the dangers of “a lack of information,” “changing circumstances,” and “moral uncertainty.”190 Professor
Sunstein argues that jurists should “focus their attention only on what is

184. Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 Mich. L. Rev. First
Impressions 37, 40–41 (2013), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/111/Kozel.pdf.
185. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1,
62 (2001).
186. Dorf, supra note 14, at 2002 (suggesting that a court may be “most likely to make
true pronouncements when it acts on its own initiative, rather than when it addresses issues
that have been framed solely by the interested parties before it”).
187. Bruhl, supra note 125, at 480–81.
188. See Leval, supra note 63, at 1255 (“[C]ourts are more likely to exercise flawed, illconsidered judgment, more likely to overlook salutary cautions and contraindications, more
likely to pronounce flawed rules, when uttering dicta than when deciding their cases.”). Similar arguments have been made with respect to the Supreme Court’s treatment of facts. See
Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 59, 63 (2013) (arguing that the
Court’s peripheral or sua sponte factual conclusions do not warrant deference because, among
other reasons, the “Court is not a factfinding institution” and “[f]acts change over time”).
189. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 59 (“If advance planning is important, or if the judges
have confidence in a wide ruling or a theoretically ambitious argument, then minimalism is a
mistake.”). But see id. at 60 (arguing that “many of the most difficult issues in constitutional
law cannot sensibly be resolved by rule”).
190. Id. at 5; see also Caminker, supra note 43, at 52.
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necessary to resolve particular disputes.”191 That minimalist approach bears
notable similarities to then–Judge Roberts’s embrace of case-by-case, “bottom up” judging during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings.192 Both
views exhibit skepticism about issuing generalized edicts rather than narrow,
fact-intensive rulings.193
Just as an inclusive reading of precedent carries implications for everything from uniformity to error entrenchment, an inclusive approach to precedent can affect the crafting of Supreme Court opinions. On one hand,
greater confidence that peripheral and general statements will receive deference might encourage the justices to pepper their opinions with wide-ranging propositions. An inclusive view of precedent could thus be criticized as
an engine of judicial activism, affording the justices unwarranted “power to
render decisions on any issues they please.”194 On the other hand, the inclusive view might be associated with higher decision costs and “more fractured” opinions at the Supreme Court.195 Enhancing the forward-looking
resonance of peripheral or wide-ranging statements increases the likelihood
that such statements will generate significant debate and prove difficult to
articulate in a way that satisfies a majority of justices.196
Other costs of precedential constraint are context dependent. By demanding adherence to a firm set of marching orders, vertical precedents can
impede lower courts’ ability to create value through judicial innovation. Inferior courts are often well positioned to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Supreme Court decisions. They observe the operation of those
decisions in full factual and legal context rather than through the narrow,
antiseptic frame provided by grants of certiorari on carefully crafted questions. Inferior courts also have more occasions to grapple with Supreme
Court precedents than does the Supreme Court itself, whose light docket
serves to limit its interventions.197 In addition, inferior courts may, by virtue

191. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 9; cf. Leval, supra note 63, at 1261 (“Our readiness to
trust a court’s rulings of law depends on the assumption that the adverse parties will each
vigorously assert the best defense of its positions. . . . When, however, the court asserts rules
outside the scope of its judgment, that salutary adversity is often absent.”).
192. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 159 (2005).
193. Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
1454, 1520 (2000) (“Narrow judicial decisionmaking, especially in areas wrought with factual
or moral uncertainty . . . is defensible not as a response to the supposedly superior competence
of the political branches in making predictive judgments, but simply as a means of reducing
the risk of judicial error in making such judgments.”).
194. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 5, at 1057 n.313.
195. See Farber, supra note 6, at 1201.
196. See Schauer, supra note 123, at 684 (“Once we recognize the extent to which the
words of an opinion take on a canonical role not unlike that played by the words in a statute,
the process of writing those words rather than other words becomes particularly important.”).
197. See Owens & Simon, supra note 171, at 1224.
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of the judges’ backgrounds and experiences, bring to bear useful perspectives that a Supreme Court composed of only nine justices cannot fully replicate. A broad understanding of precedential scope limits the contributions
that inferior courts might otherwise make to the rational and effective operation of the law. It is certainly true that, even “after the Supreme Court has
decided a case, there will often remain some vital role for the inferior courts
to play.”198 But the more broadly a precedent is construed, the smaller that
role will be.
The obvious response to these concerns is that inferior courts can exhibit grumbling fidelity to precedent simply by voicing their disapproval.
Established norms of opinion-writing permit judges to criticize a Supreme
Court decision even as they declare themselves bound to apply it.199 In articulating their substantive disagreement with precedent, inferior judges can
alert the Supreme Court to the perceived vulnerabilities of a given decision.200 That option remains available regardless of how broadly the scope of
precedent is defined.201 The Supreme Court will then have the opportunity
to determine whether the inferior judges’ advice ought to be heeded.
Still, this solution is underwhelming as a practical matter. The Supreme
Court exercises almost complete discretion over its docket. The Court is
under no obligation to hear a case simply because one or more federal
judges have expressed disapproval of a precedent. The odds of attracting
attention would almost surely be better if an inferior court were actually to
depart from a prior statement of the Supreme Court or candidly truncate a
rule the Court previously announced.202 In those situations, the justices presumably would be more inclined to exercise their supervisory authority to
respond to the inferior court’s dissention.203 A federal judge’s ability to draw

198. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris
Execution, 102 Yale L.J. 255, 277 (1992).
199. Caminker, supra note 153, at 863 (discussing the use of critical concurrences).
200. E.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J.,
concurring) (“The Supreme Court has chosen this erroneous path and only the Court can
rectify the error.”), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
201. E.g., W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 34 (Mont. 2011) (Nelson,
J., dissenting) (“While, as a member of this Court, I am bound to follow Citizens United, I do
not have to agree with the Supreme Court’s decision. And, to be absolutely clear, I do not
agree with it.” (footnote omitted)); see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L. Rev. 253, 255–56 (2009) (emphasizing the duty of inferiorcourt judges to respect the Supreme Court but adding that “esteem can likewise be manifest in
the respectful expression of difference—that too is the essence of the judicial craft”).
202. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) (2010) (including among the “[c]onsiderations [g]overning
[re]view on [c]ertiorari” whether “a state court or a United States court of appeals . . . has
decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this
Court”).
203. Caminker, supra note 153, at 863 (noting the possibility that “outright disobedience,
given its unique emotive force, is more likely to attract the Supreme Court’s attention and
encourage discretionary review than is the more subtle critical concurrence”).
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attention to the Supreme Court’s missteps is thus impaired when she must
rely on grumbling fidelity as opposed to outright opposition.204
Of course, even when inferior courts are compelled to follow a troublesome precedent, the Supreme Court can stamp out the sparks of error.
Therein lies the most dramatic difference between the vertical and horizontal contexts in contributing to the costs of precedential constraint. It is always within the power of the Supreme Court to reconsider its precedents
during the course of appellate review. But when the justices defer to a past
mistake on grounds of stare decisis, entrenchment of error goes from theoretical possibility to concrete reality. Absent a constitutional amendment or
effective legislative response, there is no supervisory authority with the ability to correct the justices’ work. While the prospect of Supreme Court review serves as a safeguard against the entrenchment of flawed precedents in
the lower courts, there is no such safety net when deference comes from the
Supreme Court itself.
3. Differential Approaches to Scope
The foregoing discussion has assumed that the scope of precedent is
defined identically in the vertical and horizontal contexts. That is, the parts
of a Supreme Court decision that are binding upon inferior courts are the
same parts that are binding upon future iterations of the Supreme Court.
Further, the parts of a precedent that the Supreme Court may choose to
disregard are equally dispensable from the standpoint of inferior courts.
This assumption may be relaxed. It is possible to imagine a scenario in
which the Supreme Court construes its precedents quite narrowly even while
demanding inclusive interpretations among the inferior courts. The explanation might be that the virtues of uniformity and the need for guidance justify an inclusive approach to vertical precedent, while the dangers of
entrenching mistakes warrant a narrower view of precedent in the Supreme
Court itself.
Such an arrangement would be susceptible to some of the challenges
discussed above. To take just one example, a Supreme Court that adopts a
narrow view of its own precedents may reduce the entrenchment of error,
but it will generate countervailing costs in terms of stability and continuity.205 While differential approaches to the scope of precedent are tools
for maximizing the benefits of constraint while minimizing its costs, even
the most ingenious solution will involve trade-offs. Differential approaches
accordingly present the same conceptual issues as uniform definitions that
treat precedential scope identically across the vertical and horizontal
domains.

204. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution 232 (2012) (“An inferior
may tell his boss that she is wrong, but must nevertheless follow her instructions.”).
205. See supra Section III.B.1.
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C. Precedential Scope and Interpretive Foundations
The previous Section surveyed the costs and benefits associated with
competing visions of precedential scope. Translating those costs and benefits
into normative conclusions requires an appeal to deeper premises that define the role of the federal courts and the proper ends of constitutional interpretation. The following subsections examine several constitutional
methodologies and their respective implications for the choice between the
inclusive and restrictive approaches to precedent.
1. Common Law Constitutionalism
Some methods of constitutional interpretation imply an inclusive scope
of precedent. Prominent among them is common law constitutionalism,
which seeks to promote the evolution of constitutional law toward moral
and just results while recognizing the value of precedent on grounds including constraint and humility.206
Common law constitutionalism is consistent with presumptive fidelity
to past judicial statements regardless of whether they are categorized as
holdings or dicta. The common law approach depends on leveraging precedent as a source of meaningful constraint on judges.207 Stripping precedents
to their narrow core would undermine that constraining function, as subsequent judges would possess extensive discretion to indulge their own subjective intuitions. A broad vision of precedent thus inheres in the very nature of
common law constitutionalism. Truncate the scope of precedent and the
theory comes undone.
The importance of construing precedents broadly is amplified because,
unlike interpretive methodologies such as originalism, common law constitutionalism declines to fall back on fidelity to the Constitution’s original
meaning as a source of constraint.208 Without a healthy regard for precedent,
judges would be left largely to their own devices. An inclusive approach to
precedent helps common law constitutionalism to ensure that today’s judges
face genuine constraint through the pronouncements of their predecessors.
By contrast, common law constitutionalism’s focus on judicial humility and
deference to “the collected wisdom reflected in what others have done”209
clashes with a restrictive approach to precedent that dismisses a vast amount
206. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 891–96.
207. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 Const. Comment. 299, 300
(2005) (“[M]any constitutional principles that are morally appealing are simply off limits,
because of precedent.”).
208. Indeed, common law constitutionalists have questioned whether original meaning
can be an effective source of constraint. E.g., David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be
Originalists, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 969, 973 (2008) (“Judges pick and choose among
precedents, often overrule precedents, and follow precedent uncertainly. But it seems to me
that originalism is much more manipulable. As a practical matter, precedent closes off many
options.” (footnote omitted)).
209. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 845, 857 (2007).
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of judicial analysis as undeserving of deference. The more coherent practice
for the common law constitutionalist is to pay close attention to the analysis
contained in the judicial opinions of the past, regardless of whether that
analysis was general or specific, broad or narrow, holding or dictum. The
aim is to take seriously what has gone before.
To be sure, common law constitutionalism entails that precedents may
be overruled when they impair the sound or just implementation of constitutional law. But that issue is one of precedential strength, not scope.210 Regardless of how powerfully a precedent is deemed to constrain, the common
law–constitutionalist position is most compatible with a capacious view of
precedential scope that contemplates at least some degree of deference for a
wide array of judicial propositions.
It does not follow that common law constitutionalism must eschew all
other safeguards against judicial overreaching. For a common law constitutionalist who supports the incremental evolution of the law, the inclusive
paradigm of precedent can raise concerns by permitting judges to make
sweeping changes in the course of a single opinion. Mitigating that risk requires judges to fight the urge to draw their opinions broadly even when
precedent provides no obstacle to their doing so. By combining a principle
of restraint in one’s own pronouncements with a practice of giving serious
regard to the pronouncements of one’s predecessors, common law constitutionalism can facilitate gradualism in adjudicative change.
Ultimately, then, the premises of common law constitutionalism suggest
the need for an inclusive paradigm of precedent in which presumptive deference attaches to general rules, rationales, and doctrinal frameworks in addition to narrow results. More generally, the example of common law
constitutionalism begins to illustrate how beliefs about the nature of constitutional interpretation can support a particular vision of precedential scope.
2. Originalism
While common law constitutionalism is compatible with the inclusive
paradigm of precedent, other interpretive methodologies imply a different
vision of precedential scope.
Consider the case of originalism. The common ground for originalists is
a belief that “the original meaning of each provision of the Constitution was
fixed at the time of its framing and ratification.”211 This focus on fixed
meanings can seem to put originalism at odds with deference to judicial
precedents that deviate from the enacted Constitution. And, in fact, some
originalists have emphasized that tension in challenging the doctrine of stare
decisis.212 Other originalists do not go so far as to disavow any adherence to
210. See supra Section I.A.
211. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 147, 154 (2012).
212. See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289 (2005).
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incorrect precedents, but, in light of their fidelity to original meanings, they
nevertheless limit the extent to which they recognize stare decisis as authorizing deviations from the enacted Constitution.213
One way in which originalists can manage the relationship between stare
decisis and the Constitution’s original meaning is by adopting a narrow view
of precedential scope. By construing precedents narrowly, originalists can
find some room for stare decisis while controlling the extent to which judicial gloss obstructs the implementation of the Constitution’s original meaning.214 Yet this observation is too simple to capture the nuanced relationship
between precedent and original meaning, for there is a great deal of conceptual disagreement even among proponents of originalism. That disagreement includes the normative justifications for adopting the originalist
methodology, which in turn determine the proper role of judicial precedent.
A concrete example will be useful. Among those who have argued for
the compatibility of original meaning with judicial precedent are consequentialist originalists. For consequentialists, a central reason for abiding by the
Constitution’s original meaning is the belief that, because the Constitution
was the product of supermajoritarian agreement, it will tend to yield desirable results.215 Even so, the consequentialist position permits the displacement
of original meaning with judicial precedent in certain situations. For example, courts may depart from the Constitution’s original meaning in cases
involving “entrenched precedents,” which “are so strongly supported that
they would be enacted by constitutional amendment if they were overturned
by the courts.”216 In such cases, a belief in supermajoritarian wisdom is compatible with deference to precedent notwithstanding the resulting deviation
from the Constitution’s original meaning.217
This reasoning is easy enough to apply to substantive rules. It is plausible that rules such as “racial segregation in public schools is not allowed”218
and “paper money is valid”219 enjoy supermajoritarian support. Doctrinal
213. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 805 (defending an “intermediate”
position on precedent); Lash, supra note 3, at 1441 (“Preserving legitimacy under popular
sovereignty-based originalism . . . does not require the complete abandonment of stare
decisis.”).
214. It also remains possible to argue that originalist precedents should be interpreted
broadly while nonoriginalist precedents should be narrowly construed, although that distinction requires its own defense.
215. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 831. Other benefits noted by the authors
include “the clarity, predictability, and judicial constraint” that originalism can produce and
the preservation of the “important role of the constitutional amendment process” as the
proper avenue for constitutional updating. Id. at 831–32.
216. Id. at 837.
217. Id. at 837–38. Professor Amar reaches a similar conclusion through focusing on principles of popular sovereignty. See Amar, supra note 204, at 238 (“An erroneous precedent that
improperly deviates from the written Constitution may in some situations stand if the precedent is later championed not merely by the Court, but also by the people.”).
218. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
219. Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457
(1870).
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frameworks and broadly articulated rationales, by contrast, will seldom rise
to that level. While consequentialist originalism is theoretically consistent
with a broad definition of precedent in those rare cases where a precedent’s
general prescriptions or animating principles have achieved supermajoritarian acceptance, the more likely scenario would seem to be one in which
substantive rules enjoy supermajoritarian support while other elements of
judicial opinions do not. The effect would be to align consequentialist
originalism with a restrictive paradigm of precedent in order to avoid
privileging judicial pronouncements whose supermajoritarian support is
wanting.
But supermajoritarian acceptance is not the only consequentialist rationale for following precedent. Consequentialists also contend that the Constitution’s original meaning should yield to judicial precedent in situations
where an overruling would create “enormous costs.”220 Again, this argument
applies most naturally to judicial results—the example of paper money remains salient—rather than abstract or extraneous rhetoric. Still, it is possible that departing from a prior court’s generalized statements or doctrinal
frameworks could threaten substantial disruption.
Recall the example of McDonald v. City of Chicago, in which the Supreme Court discussed the selective-incorporation framework that has been
applied in numerous cases involving the assertion of constitutional rights
against the states.221 Revising that framework would create serious costs by
undermining settled expectations. It would also increase the expenditure of
judicial resources as future courts attempted to understand and apply the
new regime. These implications are significant from the consequentialist
perspective. Further, they illustrate the general point that, when transition
costs are great, the consequentialist position can be consistent with deference to aspects of Supreme Court opinions such as doctrinal frameworks
that extend well beyond their central rulings.
On balance, then, consequentialist originalism will often cohere with a
restrictive understanding that limits the precedential effect of constitutional
decisions to their substantive results. But given the theory’s overarching concern with functional costs and benefits, consequentialist originalism may
suggest a more inclusive understanding of precedential scope under limited
circumstances. As with the example of common law constitutionalism, consequentialism’s normative premises provide the basis for its definition of the
proper precedential scope.
3. Pragmatism
The scope of precedent takes still another shape within pragmatic approaches to interpretation. Pragmatic judging, as described by proponents
such as Justice Breyer, resolves constitutional disputes by relying “heavily on

220. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 836.
221. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); see also supra Section I.C.2.
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purposes and related consequences.”222 At the same time, pragmatism places
a “thumb on the scale in the direction of stability”223 for purposes of
“mak[ing] the judicial system and the law itself workable.”224 While the
touchstone is practical results, there is recognition that the benefits of standing by precedent can be considerable.
This focus on practical benefits should inform the definition of precedential scope. Legal stability can result from adherence to peripheral propositions as well as central ones. Likewise, stability can emerge from the
preservation of sweeping principles as well as fact-intensive rulings. Pragmatic theories of interpretation accordingly must remain open to the possibility that the efficacy and soundness of the legal system is best promoted by
adopting an inclusive view of precedent. Indeed, this type of thinking might
explain Justice Breyer’s approach in cases such as Parents Involved, in which
he acknowledged the status of a past statement as dicta but described it as
warranting deference because it “provides, and has widely been thought to
provide, authoritative legal guidance.”225 From the pragmatic perspective, it
is unconvincing to argue that a given proposition has no claim to deference
based on some “rigid distinction[ ] between holdings and dicta.”226 There
must be a more careful inquiry into the practical effects of construing precedents broadly versus narrowly.
The role of reliance expectations reinforces the correlation of pragmatism with an inclusive approach to precedent. Stakeholders may make forward-looking decisions based not only on what the Supreme Court
concludes but also on what it says along the way. Pragmatists tend to be
solicitous of reliance interests, whether reliance manifests itself in terms of
public expectations227 or private decisionmaking228 (or both). The pragmatic
position implies that, if protecting reliance expectations can furnish practical
benefits, those expectations should not be dismissed as inapposite merely
because they attached to a passage that might technically be defined as
dicta.229
222. Breyer, supra note 179, at 81; see also id. at 82 (“[T]he Court can and should take
account of purposes and consequences, of institutional competences and relationships, of the
values that underlie institutional collaboration, and of the need to assert constitutional
limits.”).
223. Id. at 153.
224. Id. at 149.
225. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 831 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Parents Involved is discussed supra in Section I.C.1.
226. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 831 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
227. See Breyer, supra note 179, at 152 (“[T]he public’s reliance on a decision argues
strongly (but, as Brown shows, not determinatively) against overruling an earlier case.”).
228. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 925–26
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (adopting a broad view of the types of reliance expectations that
are relevant to the stare-decisis calculus).
229. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 831 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality
“must explain to the courts and to the Nation why it would abandon guidance set forth many
years before, guidance that countless others have built upon over time, and which the law has
continuously embodied”).
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It does not follow that considerations of reliance or stability must always
carry the day, for ultimately “the judge must make a pragmatic decision,
weighing the harms and benefits of stability against change.”230 The point is
simply that factors such as reliance and stability should not be treated as out
of bounds based on a conception of precedential scope as “an exercise in
mathematical logic.”231 Countervailing concerns of policy and morality may
justify departures from precedent even when such departures would create
instability and disrupt reliance interests. But at the threshold level of defining the scope of precedent, the superficial line between holding and dicta
should not foreclose a deeper inquiry into the relative benefits of retaining
or jettisoning a flawed decision.
At the same time, pragmatism does not require that all dicta be infused
with constraining force. Where a point was not “fully argued,” received inadequate attention from the Court, or was “hedged” in the Court’s opinion,
it may be treated as nonbinding;232 factors such as a statement’s evident
depth of deliberation are linked to practical considerations such as its likelihood of error. Notwithstanding these limits, however, pragmatism implies
receptiveness to an inclusive view of precedent in which presumptive deference can extend beyond an opinion’s narrow holding.
4. Conventionalism
Another useful illustration of the relationship between interpretive
methodology and the scope of precedent is the “conventionalist” mode of
constitutional interpretation.233 Conventionalism seeks to effectuate “the
consensus view about the meaning” of constitutional provisions “in the
legal community of today.”234 Part of respecting that consensus view is
deferring to judicial precedent.235 Among the asserted benefits of conventionalism is the constraint of judges: “conventionalism basically shuts off
the courts as an avenue for social change.”236 Along with constraint

230. Breyer, supra note 179, at 149.
231. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 831 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013); see also supra Section
III.A.
233. Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 509, 509 (1996).
234. Id. at 511.
235. See id. at 513 (“The conventionalist interpreter would be alert for, and would always
exhibit a bias in favor of, the status quo—understood here to mean the existing consensus view
about legal meaning in the contemporary legal community.”).
236. Id. at 522; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 977, 981 (2008) (“A judiciary that stood firm with a strong theory of precedent would rechannel our nation back toward democratic institutions and away from using
the courts to make social policy.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the
Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 Const. Comment. 271, 273 (2005) (urging “a strong theory
of precedent on grounds of judicial restraint”).
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comes enhanced stability through a decreased incidence of disruptive
transition.237
The conventionalist approach seems to imply support for the inclusive
paradigm of precedent.238 The inclusive paradigm gives formal effect to a
broad array of judicial assertions regarding the current state of the law. In so
doing, it provides meaningful constraint on future jurists. By comparison, a
more restrictive view of precedent would allow substantial leeway for courts
to disregard what had previously been settled. The restrictive view also creates the potential for heightened instability by limiting the types of propositions to which future judges must defer—another result that is in tension
with the conventionalist philosophy. For the conventionalist method to have
its desired effect of constraining judges and promoting an incremental,
Burkean approach to the law,239 it should be paired with an inclusive paradigm of precedent that sweeps widely in determining which judicial propositions are entitled to deference.
As with the example of common law constitutionalism, the conventionalist approach to precedent also has implications for the creation of precedents in the first instance.240 The inclusive view of precedent need not be
license for judges to engage in wide-ranging lawmaking on the understanding that their pronouncements will carry forward with binding force. To the
contrary, just as future judges must give due regard to existing precedents,
today’s judges must exercise restraint in crafting their own opinions if they
are to embody the conventionalist ideal. An inclusive definition of precedent
is thus consistent with the conventionalist model, but it must be combined
with a restrained mindset on the part of the judges who create the precedents of tomorrow.
5. Other Normative Commitments and Constitutional Understandings
Beyond the interpretive methodologies discussed above, the relationship
between precedential scope and interpretive theory can be reinforced by examining other commitments that inform the role of precedent in adjudication. These premises may arise as part of a fully articulated theory of
interpretation, or they may reflect discrete arguments or assumptions. In
either case, they shed additional light on the connection between normative
theory and precedential scope.
Professor Dorf, for example, has defended something like an inclusive
view of precedent based in part on rule-of-law considerations. He argues
that, “[w]hen a court discards the reasoning of a prior opinion as merely
237. See Merrill, supra note 233, at 512–13 (defending interpretations that “provide the
least disruption to settled understandings that can be discerned in the surrounding legal
landscape”).
238. Cf. id. at 514 (describing the “sources of conventional meaning” to include “Supreme
Court precedent, read broadly”).
239. See generally id. (drawing on the work of Edmund Burke in defending the conventionalist method of interpretation).
240. See supra Section III.C.1.
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dictum,” it threatens to “relegate[ ] the prior decision to the position of an
unjustifiable, arbitrary exercise of judicial power.”241 Professor Farber has
also invoked the rule of law in arguing against the practice of confining prior
constitutional decisions “to their facts.”242 Even so, he cautions that respect
for precedent is not the same as treating prior decisions as rigid rules. In
general, the better approach is to characterize constitutional rulings as flexible “standards,” making it “easier to gain and then maintain majority support for them.”243
Professor Solum has drawn on the rule of law to advance a very different
position. He defends a “neoformalist conception” of precedent in which
“[i]ndividual cases have holdings that are limited to their legally salient
facts” and “[o]nly a line of cases can develop a rule that approximates legislation.”244 Professor Solum’s theory suggests sympathy for a restrictive conception of precedent that curbs the Supreme Court’s ability to articulate
sweeping doctrinal frameworks that venture far beyond the case at hand.
Professor Caminker, another scholarly authority on the role of precedent, has defended inferior-court obedience on grounds including “judicial
economy,” “national uniformity of federal law,” and the “decisionmaking
prowess” of superior courts on matters of legal interpretation.245 Such a view
is consistent with the inclusive paradigm of precedent, as highlighted by Professor Caminker’s argument that lower-court judges should obey “well-considered dicta” from the Supreme Court.246 For some jurists and
commentators, by contrast, the proper relationship between the Supreme
Court and lower courts takes a different form; recall Judge Leval’s view of
the lower courts’ “responsibility to deliberate and decide the question which
needs to be decided.”247
It is also important to bear in mind the role of constitutional text. By
speaking in terms of a “judicial power” that extends to “Cases” and “Controversies,”248 Article III arguably suggests that deference should be withheld
from judicial hypothesizing249 and perhaps even rulemaking.250 Likewise, one
241. Dorf, supra note 14, at 2029–30. Professor Dorf notes a potential exception where the
subsequent court “suggests an alternative basis for the outcome of the precedent case.” Id. at
2030.
242. Farber, supra note 6, at 1183.
243. Id. at 1202.
244. Solum, supra note 155, at 191.
245. Caminker, supra note 43, at 36–43.
246. Id. at 73.
247. Leval, supra note 63, at 1250.
248. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
249. See Leval, supra note 63, at 1259 (“Given that the court’s sole constitutional authority
is to decide cases, what should we make of the constitutional legitimacy of lawmaking through
proclamation of dicta? It is simply without justification.”).
250. Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 998 (noting the argument that “the fundamental role of
courts, as understood traditionally and even today, is to resolve a particular dispute and to
grant a judgment, not to pronounce law”).
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might view the scope of precedent as defined in part by the distinction between “inferior Courts” and “one supreme Court,” which may imply the
binding force of Supreme Court decisions on lower federal courts.251 Such
arguments could potentially be supplemented or complicated by foundingera understandings regarding the structure of the judicial branch.252
Finally, deference to wide-ranging judicial statements might implicate
the constitutional separation of powers. Judge Leval has emphasized this
point in contending that, when judges “promulgate law through utterance of
dictum made to look like a holding,” they “seek to exercise a lawmaking
power that [they] do not rightfully possess.”253 Justice Scalia recently expressed comparable sentiments (albeit in a different context) in United States
v. Windsor, where he asserted that the Court’s “authority begins and ends
with the need to adjudge the rights of an injured party who stands before
us.”254 This perspective suggests a concern about judges veering into the
policymaking realm that is constitutionally committed to the political
branches—a concern that is exacerbated by an inclusive view of precedent.255
It is these types of theoretical and constitutional arguments from which
the scope of precedent is derived. Thinking of precedential scope in terms of
holdings and dicta misses a great deal of conceptual nuance that resides
below the surface. The question of what a precedent “stands for” cannot be
determined in a vacuum. It depends on a web of normative and methodological premises that determine the proper ends of constitutional
interpretation.

251. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see also Amar, supra note 204, at 232 (“The big idea here is
that ‘inferior’ courts should generally be bound by the interpretations, implementing
frameworks, specific holdings, precedential implications, and remedial precepts—the doctrine—of the Supremes.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 26, 80 (1999) (“Article III authorizes . . . doctrinal decisions to be made by ‘one supreme
Court,’ which presides over various ‘inferior’ federal courts and state courts in federal question
cases.”); Caminker, supra note 153, at 834 (“[I]nterpreting the supreme-inferior distinction as
creating a principal-agent relationship in which inferior courts implement the will of the Supreme Court responds most coherently to the Framers’ concerns about decentralized access to
centralized authority.”). But cf. Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 985 (“[T]he term ‘inferior,’ as used
in Article III, does not necessarily mean ‘subordinate,’ nor is it necessarily a constitutional
endorsement of a highly hierarchical organization for the judiciary.”).
252. Cf. James E. Pfander, One Supreme Court: Supremacy, Inferiority, and the
Judicial Power of the United States 41 (2009) (“[T]he Framers’ very conception of a
unitary and hierarchical, rather than a plural and horizontal, judiciary presupposed a duty on
the part of lower courts to obey their superior.”); id. at 38 (“[T]he Framers surely assumed
that inferior federal courts would apply the decisional rules of the Supreme Court, thus empowering litigants to gain the benefit of more conventional local justice without the necessity
of litigating all the way to the Supreme Court.”).
253. Leval, supra note 63, at 1250.
254. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2699 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. See Leval, supra note 63, at 1259.
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6. Summary: Precedential Scope and the Supreme Court’s Role
Whether they arise from normative arguments, constitutional understandings, or some combination thereof, varying conceptions of the judicial
role are crucial to the scope of precedent. Under the restrictive paradigm of
precedent, the Supreme Court is, first and foremost, an adjudicator. Its ability to issue pronouncements with binding effect in future disputes is limited
by the facts of the case before it. Only the Court’s narrow applications of law
to fact—not its generalized or peripheral ruminations—will receive
deference.
The inclusive paradigm reflects a different depiction of the Supreme
Court, one in which the justices are lawmakers and managers. They possess
the power to articulate detailed rationales and doctrinal frameworks that
will carry forward with binding force.256 And their authority to issue binding
declarations derives from their managerial duty to provide meaningful guidance to the federal judges who implement their legal commands.257
One might also endorse the inclusive view of precedent based on the
belief that structural features of Supreme Court decisionmaking serve to
neutralize the threat of overreaching. The Court is a multimember institution that is populated by justices of varying jurisprudential sympathies.258
The grander the proposition, the more difficult it is to cobble together five
votes in its favor.259 To the extent that one perceives these institutional dynamics as safeguards against Supreme Court overreaching, the inclusive
model may be more attractive. The same is true if one believes that the
modern Court is too wary about sweeping broadly in its rulings. Doing too
little can lead to the perpetuation of unsound rules, lingering uncertainty,
and conflict among lower courts.260 The inclusive paradigm ensures that, at
the very least, whatever the Supreme Court does say will have maximum
impact.
Surveying these competing perspectives underscores the extent to which
normative commitments and understandings of the judicial role will inform
256. See Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 1000 (criticizing the “abrupt declaration of broad,
forward-looking rules” and proposing “incremental rulemaking[ ] through case-by-case formulation of narrow rules necessary to resolve particular disputes”).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The Court can
hear only a small portion of all litigated disputes; it uses considered dicta to influence others
for which there is no room on the docket.”).
258. Breyer, supra note 179, at 154 (“[B]ecause life tenure for the justices means a Court
membership that changes only slowly over time, it also means that different members appointed after long intervals by different presidents may well have different philosophical
views.”); Kozel, supra note 24, at 1878–80.
259. See Grove, supra note 171, at 10 (“It will often be challenging to assemble even a fivemember majority for an expansive opinion. . . . These institutional constraints establish the
(very real) practical boundaries of maximalism.”); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing
the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 808 (1982) (“ ‘[F]ull exposition’ and disagreement coincide
because the more the Court tries to explain the nature and limits of its principles, the more
targets for disagreement it presents.”).
260. See supra Section III.B.1.
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the definition of precedential scope.261 The scope of a precedent is not something to be discovered or divined. Scope is constructed through the lens of
interpretive theory. It would be incorrect to say that a precedent can stand
for anything that an interpreter wishes, but it is equally mistaken to describe
precedential scope as entirely independent of the interpreter’s deeper theoretical commitments.
D. The Scope of Statutory and Common Law Precedents
While the previous Section focused on the scope of precedent in constitutional adjudication, a comparable analysis applies to statutory and common law cases.
1. Statutory Precedents
Within the statutory context, a restrictive approach to precedent would
extend deference only to the application of a particular statute to a discrete
set of facts. An inclusive approach would go further. It would permit the
Supreme Court to set forth a conclusive interpretation of a disputed statutory term that would govern future cases notwithstanding their divergent
facts.262 It would also empower the Court to craft binding doctrinal
frameworks for guiding the interpretation of statutes, as epitomized by the
two-step Chevron263 framework in the field of administrative law.264 In its
most potent form, the inclusive approach may even accord deference to
methodologies such as textualism and purposivism.265 Although statutory
methodologies do not generally receive deference as a matter of federal practice,266 such deference arguably could promote values such as stability, predictability, and respect for prior judicial statements—values that animate
the inclusive paradigm of precedent.
261. This point applies not only to the American federal system but also to precedentbased adjudication more generally. See Jan Komárek, Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent, 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 149, 158–60 (2013) (contrasting “legislative”
and “case-bound” approaches to precedent and arguing that “the conception of the ‘proper’
judicial reasoning differs from one jurisdiction to another”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 43, 78 (1993)
(arguing that “whether one thinks a more conventional, careful, and precedent-bound judiciary is good or bad will depend on one’s vision of the role of the courts in society”).
262. See supra Section II.A (discussing indicia of deliberation as a potential limitation on
the inclusive paradigm of precedent).
263. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
264. See supra Section I.C.2.
265. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 97, at 1762–64.
266. See id. at 1754 (“Methodological stare decisis . . . is generally absent from the jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation . . . .”); cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2144–45 (2002)
(noting within the context of statutory interpretation that “the Justices do not seem to treat
methodology as part of the holding of case law”). But see Gluck, supra note 97, at 1754 (suggesting that the practice may be different in some states).
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Again, the choice between these options will depend on foundational
interpretive and constitutional premises. If one ascribes great importance to
preserving stability and disseminating guidance, one will be favorably inclined toward the inclusive paradigm of precedent. By comparison, a more
limited depiction of the judicial role will lead to skepticism of the inclusive
paradigm due to its greater tendency to displace congressional commands
with judicial gloss.
2. Common Law Precedents
Much the same is true of common law precedents. The scope of a common law precedent depends on considerations including the perceived benefits of abiding by prior decisions, the proper role of the Supreme Court in
disseminating guidance for lower courts to follow, and the degree of restraint that judges ought to demonstrate in resolving the cases before them.
These factors are not derived from the superficial categories of holdings and
dicta. They are matters of normative valuation and competing understandings about the appropriate operation of the judiciary.
Some jurists and commentators may view the common law as a domain
in which legal evolution must occur incrementally and at the margins. Such
an approach would create tension with an inclusive paradigm of precedent
that allowed the Supreme Court to establish, in one fell swoop, a broad
framework that was binding on future jurists. But others might defend the
utility of broad frameworks in converting the common law from a space of
uncertainty into a source of ascertainable and stable black-letter law. For
proponents of the latter position, an inclusive approach to precedent would
be legitimate and desirable. And, of course, a host of intermediate positions
are available, including the view that certain pockets of the common law
should embody a restrictive approach to precedent while others should reflect an inclusive approach.
IV. Reforming Precedential Scope
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of precedent suffers due to its estrangement from interpretive theory. Judicial vacillation between the inclusive and restrictive paradigms often occurs without sufficient elaboration of
the underlying premises that inform the scope of precedent. That deficiency
fuels the perception of the doctrine of stare decisis as unprincipled and result oriented.267

267. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of
Reason, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1482, 1529 (2007) (“[C]ommon law theorists show that judges
often implement their biases precisely by distinguishing between precedents based on immaterial or irrelevant dimensions—by holding that dog owners are safe if the bite occurred on a
Tuesday.”).
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Addressing this problem begins with a shift toward analytical transparency, which illuminates the deeper implications of precedential deference. From there, the remaining task is leveraging that transparency in
pursuit of a jurisprudential approach that is consistent across cases.
A. Analytical Transparency
The first step in reforming the treatment of precedent is straightforward. It requires the pursuit, led by the Supreme Court, of analytical transparency in the application of precedent. That means moving beyond the
superficial categories of holdings and dicta—or, better yet, ignoring those
categories altogether—to grapple with the deeper justifications for construing a decision broadly or narrowly.
Transparency is distinct from judicial candor.268 Analytical transparency
entails not only accurately describing one’s reasons for acting but also engaging with the normative premises that motivate the action. It is candid for
a judge to say that her motivation in refusing to defer to a prior statement is
the statement’s status as dicta. In the same way, it is candid for the Supreme
Court to defend its withholding of deference from prior statements that
were merely “descriptive.”269 Yet those rationales fail the test of analytical
transparency, for they do not explain why unnecessary or descriptive statements are unworthy of deference.
The norm of analytical transparency does not require a judge to provide
a comprehensive account of which paradigm of precedent she endorses as a
general matter. It demands only that she explain the application of her reasoning to the case at hand. Does she adopt a narrow reading of precedent
based on concerns about error costs or beliefs about the proper judicial role
as defined by Article III? Does she adopt a broad view of precedent based on
the perceived virtues of stability and judicial constraint?270 Addressing questions like these is the path to an analytically transparent doctrine of
precedent.
There are numerous examples of analytical transparency in the case law
and commentary.271 Consider, for example, Justice Breyer’s inclusive approach to precedent in Parents Involved,272 or Judge Leval’s defense of a far
more restrictive view.273 The goal is to convert this sporadic practice into a
uniform convention. Such a convention would foreclose the dismissal of
prior propositions simply because they were descriptive or uttered in dicta.
268. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 734
(1987) (“A judge . . . fulfills any requirement of candor when he believes what he is saying
about the force of a particular case.”).
269. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
270. See supra Section III.C.
271. For illustrative examples, see supra Section I.B.
272. See supra Section I.C.1.
273. See supra Section I.B.
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Likewise, the convention would deny deference to wide-ranging and generalized statements, such as broad rationales and doctrinal frameworks, absent
some explanation of the underlying objectives being pursued. The result
would be a jurisprudence that does a better job of clarifying the factors that
ultimately define the scope of precedent.
B.

Jurisprudential Consistency

Once transparency is established at the level of the individual case, the
next step is pursuing jurisprudential consistency across cases. If the doctrine
of stare decisis is to have independent force in shaping judicial behavior, it
must discourage judges from making case-specific modifications based on
their individual, subjective assessments.
Achieving consistency across cases is more challenging than achieving
transparency in any particular case. The reason is simple: different cases can
present matters in a different light, encouraging judges to alter their approaches to suit the facts at hand. Despite these challenges, the threshold
pursuit of analytical transparency increases the likelihood of consistency
from case to case. Transparency encourages judges to disclose their reasons
for treating some past propositions as binding and others as dispensable.
Once those reasons are made plain, they are available for external stakeholders to scrutinize and cite. When submerged intuitions about precedential
effect are excavated and expressed as intelligible rules, their disciplining
power is enhanced.274 The act of articulating premises may also make those
premises clearer to the judge herself, improving the prospects of a transparent and consistent account of precedent.
Even so, the relationship between precedent and interpretive theory
raises serious questions about the plausibility of achieving jurisprudential
consistency. The Supreme Court has not adopted a consistent interpretive
methodology. Instead, it exhibits an interpretive approach that is fundamentally pluralistic.275 Factors including text, enactment history, pragmatic evaluation of policy results, and principles of justice all have occasional roles to
play, without any overarching theory to determine which considerations are
appropriate in which circumstances.276 The Court’s interpretive pluralism
complicates its handling of precedent: If the justices cannot agree on a set of
274. Cf. Scalia, supra note 183, at 1179 (“[W]hen, in writing for the majority of the Court,
I adopt a general rule . . . I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well.”).
275. See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1063 (2010) (noting the “substantially pluralist cast” of “contemporary American constitutional practice”); Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron
and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377, 1383 (1997)
(“There is no consensus in our legal system about the appropriate significance or weight to be
given to the many considerations that plausibly can be thought relevant to statutory interpretation.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 13 (1996) (recognizing that “the Supreme Court has not made an official choice” among constitutional
theories).
276. See Kozel, supra note 24, at 1875–91.
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principles to guide legal interpretation, how can they consistently apply derivative principles of precedent? Perhaps the current, undertheorized state of
the law is the best we can hope for in a world of interpretive pluralism.277
In matters of precedential strength, interpretive pluralism seriously impedes the consistent treatment of prior cases. The Court has explained that
the question of whether a precedent should be overruled depends on,
among other factors, the importance of correcting a given judicial error.278
But the impact of error cannot be determined in the abstract. It requires
consulting an interpretive methodology to determine what types of harms
are legally relevant.279 For some jurists and commentators, a precedent is
problematic if it creates unjust results. For others, considerations of justice
are generally inapposite; precedents are problematic only insofar as they depart from the Constitution’s original meaning.280 Interpretive theory is the
metric for wading through these arguments and assessing the fallout from
an erroneous decision. Without deliberate reference to interpretive theory,
the calculus of whether to overrule a dubious precedent is necessarily
incomplete.
As compared with the determination of precedential strength, the definition of precedential scope appears to have yielded greater consensus among
Supreme Court justices. In practice, there appears to be substantial agreement among the sitting justices that the Court’s institutional role is, at least
occasionally, to issue generalized guidance that the lower courts must follow.
Indeed, the prevalence of the inclusive paradigm implies as much.281 There
also seems to be support for the notion that codifying statements and broad
doctrinal frameworks can warrant deference, including deference from the
Supreme Court itself, even when they are extended far beyond the factual
contexts from where they originated.282 Thus, it may be that, despite their
varying interpretive sympathies, the justices of the Supreme Court have generally coalesced around an inclusive view of precedent, albeit with some notable exceptions.283
If the justices have embraced something like an inclusive view of precedent, jurisprudential consistency becomes a possibility. Still, it is important
to recognize the consequences of such a conclusion. First, the Court would
277. See Fallon, supra note 14, at 125–26 (“[V]iews about matters of background principle
almost certainly dominate the interstices of doctrinal argument and guide contestable judgments. . . . [T]he justification for this submersion of what is most fundamentally at stake must
be that this is a second-best way of implementing the Constitution under circumstances of
reasonable disagreement.”).
278. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“When considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the
importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them
decided right.”).
279. See Kozel, supra note 24, at 1864.
280. See supra Section III.C.2.
281. See supra Section I.C.
282. See supra Section I.C.
283. See supra Section I.B.
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be foreclosed from dismissing past statements as undeserving of deference
merely because they were nonessential, counterfactual, or “descriptive.”284
There might be other legitimate reasons for withholding deference, such as
an evident lack of deliberation.285 But well-considered statements would be
entitled to some degree of deference notwithstanding their status as dicta.
Second, accepting the inclusive paradigm implies other understandings on
the part of the Court, including the conclusion that Article III permits a
fairly wide-ranging view of binding precedent.
Even assuming that the Court has found its way to something like an
inclusive vision of precedential scope, analytical transparency would improve if the Court were to make its approach—and the reasons behind that
approach—more explicit. Of course, it is possible to delay consideration of
foundational motivations in the name of fostering consensus. In the
meantime, the normative and interpretive implications of precedent could
remain below the surface. Sooner or later, however, the deeper arguments
surrounding the proper scope of precedent will need to rise to the surface if
the doctrine of stare decisis is to achieve true consistency and coherence.
V. Comparative Institutional Considerations
This Article’s topic has been the treatment of Supreme Court precedent
in federal litigation. Before closing, I offer a few comments about the scope
of precedent in other institutional contexts. I begin by considering adjudication in the federal appellate courts. I then turn to the scope of Supreme
Court precedent as applied by the states, whose sovereignty raises important
questions of federalism.
A. Circuit Law
Decisions of a federal court of appeals are binding on district courts
within the relevant circuit.286 They also exert horizontal force on future appellate panels, which are required to follow circuit law.287 Generally, only an
en banc court of appeals may overrule a panel decision, although some circuits have developed procedural alternatives to streamline the process.288
284. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
285. See supra Section II.A.
286. E.g., Caminker, supra note 153, at 824.
287. E.g., United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A decision of a
panel of this court becomes the law of the circuit and is binding on other panels unless it is
overruled by a subsequent en banc opinion of this court or a superseding contrary decision of
the Supreme Court.” (quoting Etheridge v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 9 F.3d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir.
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
288. See, e.g., 7th Cir. R. 40(e) (providing a mechanism for overruling circuit law without an en banc rehearing upon approval by a majority of active judges); Outlaw v. Airtech Air
Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Because this part of
our opinion rejects a prior statement of circuit precedent, it has been considered separately
and approved by the full court.”).
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The vertical and horizontal operation of circuit precedent bears some
resemblance to the operation of Supreme Court precedent. The similarity
may suggest that questions of precedential scope should be resolved the
same way in both domains. But to assume such equivalence would be premature. There are meaningful grounds of distinction between circuit court
precedents and Supreme Court precedents. For example, intermediate appellate courts may tend to make more interpretive errors than the Supreme
Court. This is not necessarily due to any lesser competence but rather to the
fact that the Supreme Court ordinarily gets to benefit from a circuit court’s
reasoning in reaching its own decision, while the reverse is not true. A reduced risk of error may also result from the Supreme Court’s light docket,289
as well as from the substantial attention its cases receive from interested
parties who provide diverse perspectives in the form of amicus curiae briefs.
Because increased risks of error can dilute the net benefits of precedential
constraint, there is a basis for concluding that circuit court decisions should
be construed more narrowly than Supreme Court decisions in both vertical
and horizontal operation.
The same conclusion might follow from the Supreme Court’s unique
position atop the judicial hierarchy. If one adopts a view of the Supreme
Court as the federal judiciary’s manager, it is appropriate for the Court to
exercise broad powers to issue binding guidance, even in the form of generalized and wide-ranging statements.290 That justification does not carry the
same resonance with respect to federal appellate courts, which have smaller
areas of oversight and more cases through which they can explicate the law.
By contrast, considerations of uniformity, consistency, and stability that
are associated with deference to Supreme Court precedent remain salient in
the context of circuit precedent. What is more, adopting different principles
of scope for Supreme Court and circuit precedents might prove troublesome
to administer. In light of the administrative costs, there is an argument for
applying a single model of precedential scope to Supreme Court decisions
and circuit court decisions alike.
For present purposes, there is no need to proceed beyond these outlines.
Extrapolating any further would require a comprehensive analysis of the
ramifications of circuit precedent. In constructing a system of precedent, the
initial step should be examining the implications of constraint at each level
of the judicial hierarchy. Only upon completing that project can we determine whether the benefits of a uniform approach outweigh the costs of disregarding court-specific considerations.
B. State-Court Interpretation
The similarities between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts do
not carry over to the relationship between the federal and state judiciaries. It
289. For a recent analysis of the effect of docket size on appellate adjudication, see generally Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (2011).
290. See supra Section III.C.6.
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is well established that state courts are constrained by Supreme Court decisions on federal and constitutional matters.291 According to the justices, such
constraint is meant to “preserve the integrity of federal law.”292 But there are
obvious differences between state courts and inferior federal courts. The first
is their constitutional status. As Professor Caminker has explained, “though
the Supremacy Clause declares that ‘the Judges in every State shall be bound’
by federal law, neither that Clause nor any other demands that state courts
defer to a particular actor’s interpretation of federal law.”293
Further, even if one believes that state courts have a duty to follow Supreme Court decisions, uncertainty surrounds the process of defining a precedent’s scope. The simplest response—that the scope of precedent should
be the same as it is with respect to inferior federal courts—has the advantages of clarity and efficiency. That arrangement would also enhance the
uniformity of law, at least assuming the continued prevalence of a relatively
inclusive vision of vertical precedent within the federal judiciary.294
Still, it is far from obvious that the calculus should be identical once
considerations of federalism enter the picture. In declining to review decisions that include an adequate and independent ground in state law, the
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of “[r]espect for the independence of state courts.”295 The sovereignty of the states may justify a
greater sphere of discretion for state court judges relative to inferior federal
judges in the treatment of Supreme Court precedent. Even for those who
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012) (extending the Supreme Court’s power of certiorari to
“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State” when there is a federal
question or constitutional claim).
292. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Even so, such constraint does not
represent the only plausible way to arrange the relationship between sovereign tribunals. An
intriguing debate is underway in the United Kingdom, where the dynamic between the U.K.
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights is receiving considerable attention.
One notable characterization of the relationship is that of Lord Phillips, who has contended
that it is occasionally appropriate for the U.K. Supreme Court to “decline to follow” a decision
of the European Court of Human Rights in order to afford the latter “the opportunity to
reconsider the particular aspect of the decision that is in issue” and to foster a “valuable
dialogue between” the two courts. R v. Horncastle, [2009] UKSC 14, [11] (appeal taken from
Eng.); see also Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom,
108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 543, 588–90 (2014) (situating Lord Phillips’s statement within the broader
context of relations between the two courts).
293. Caminker, supra note 153, at 837 (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2); see also Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme Court’s Errors, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1029, 1039 (2012) (“The Constitution nowhere
characterizes [state courts] as ‘inferior’ to any federal court, or implies that they are to be
integrated into a hierarchical federal establishment.”).
294. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 252, at 23 (“One way to avoid the expense and inconvenience of appellate review in every case was to create lower federal courts and give them final
authority over disputes of modest size. Reliance on state courts as an alternative would make
little sense if those courts were not similarly obliged to comply with the Supreme Court’s
decisions. . . . The structural and geographic logic of the Madisonian compromise suggests
that state courts should face the same obligation to apply Supreme Court precedents as the
lower federal courts, at least when they act in a comparable institutional setting.”).
295. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.
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would generally defend a capacious definition of precedent, principles of
federalism might suggest that, within the state judiciaries, only the narrow
rulings of Supreme Court opinions should be constraining. The objective
would be to minimize the degree of intrusion into state affairs while ensuring a core of uniformity in the application of federal and constitutional law.
Similarly, those who defend broad constraint on the rationale that the lower
federal courts should behave as the Supreme Court’s faithful agents296 might
conclude that such logic does not extend to the courts of the sovereign
states. These arguments lend some plausibility to the claim that the inclusive
view of precedent should be confined to federal adjudication, if only to stake
out a province in which state courts can challenge sweeping pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
Articulating the precise bounds of state-court constraint is outside the
scope of this Article, but the following point is clear enough: the unique
dimensions of federal–state relations should inform the operation of Supreme Court precedents in the state courts. The scope of precedent must
always be attuned to institutional context.
Conclusion
This Article has provided a descriptive and normative account of the
scope of precedent in federal adjudication. Descriptively, the Article has
claimed that Supreme Court precedents are often defined capaciously and
inclusively in constraining future courts, although there are notable exceptions in which a more restrictive approach emerges. Normatively, the Article
has contended that the classic distinction between holdings and dicta is inadequate for evaluating the treatment of precedent in contemporary federal
practice. Whether precedents are defined narrowly or broadly should depend on considerations of interpretive methodology, constitutional understanding, and institutional context.
Finally, the Article has outlined proposals for reforming the jurisprudence of precedent in order to enhance its soundness. The first step is a
commitment to analytical transparency, which brings the foundational drivers of precedential constraint to the forefront. The second, and more challenging, step is achieving jurisprudential consistency across cases. These
proposals provide a framework for reconceptualizing the scope of precedent
by moving beyond the superficial categories of holding and dicta and toward
a richer, more meaningful discourse on the relationship between the courts
of past, present, and future.

296. Cf. Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy,
105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 535, 563 (2011) (questioning the “common assumption that the lower
federal courts are agents with a duty to act on behalf of the Supreme Court”).

